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Charitable enterprises deserve – indeed, they require – analysis,
evaluation, planning; they are not matters to be lightly undertaken or
perfunctorily carried on; they merit the genuine interest and undivided
attention of the persons to whom society has entrusted their
accomplishment. Consequently, the efforts of the speculator or the
trader – whether successful or unsuccessful – are intrinsically
inconsistent with the proper management of the affairs of a foundation.

– Report on Private Foundations,
Senate Finance Committee (1965)1
I. INTRODUCTION
How much should charity and business intersect? Recent trends
point toward a growing entanglement between the for-profit and
nonprofit sectors. This trend is evident in the growth of social enterprise2
and the advent of hybrid organizational forms designed to foster social
enterprise, such as the L3C3 and the benefit corporation.4 A growing
1. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEP’T REP. ON PRIVATE
FOUNDS. 53 (Comm. Print 1965) (hereinafter 1965 REPORT).
2. The Social Enterprise Alliance defines “social enterprises” as “businesses whose primary
purpose is the common good. They use the methods and disciplines of business and the power of the
marketplace to advance their social, environmental and human justice agendas.” The Case for Social
Enterprise Alliance, SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-socialenterprise (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). The Centre for Social Enterprise identifies a number of
potential definitions of the term “social enterprise.” What Is Social Enterprise?, B.C. CTR. FOR SOC.
ENTERPRISE, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/C3_BC.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). In
general, the term connotes a business enterprise that uses for-profit business methodologies to
further a social purpose. The enterprise’s “[a]ssets and wealth are used to create community benefit”
rather than being distributed to shareholders, and the enterprise is “accountable to both its members
and a wider community” by maintaining a double-bottom line, producing healthy financial and
social returns. John Thompson & Bob Doherty, The Diverse World of Social Enterprise: A
Collection of Social Enterprise Stories, 33 INT’L J. OF SOC. ECON. 361, 362 (1974), available at
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/03068290610660643.
3. Low-profit limited liability companies, or L3Cs, are a separate form of state law legal
entity. Generally, an L3C is an LLC that is organized for a business purpose but is operated to
accomplish one or more charitable purposes and would not have been formed but for those
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number of business schools now teach social impact investing and
venture philanthropy as part of their regular curriculum.5 Commentators
ask whether charities should be run more like businesses6 and whether
businesses should evaluate success on a bottom line that includes not
only profit but charity.7 Some have gone as far as to suggest models for
for-profit charity.8
Although it has received a great deal of press recently, the issue of
the entanglement of business and charity is not new. In the early 1960s,
charitable purposes. In addition, no significant purpose of the L3C can be the production of income
or appreciation of property, although it may, in fact, produce a profit or benefit from the
appreciation of property. Finally, an L3C may not engage in political or lobbying activities. See,
e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (West, Westlaw through 2013-14 Vt. Gen. Assembly
(2014)). In general, the L3C facilitates social enterprise by elevating charity as the primary (but not
sole) purpose for the entity. L3C enabling statutes, such as Vermont’s, were originally drafted with
the intent to facilitate “program related investments” (as defined in Code Section 4944(c)) by
private foundation investors. For a critique of L3Cs as vehicles for program related investments, see
Cassady V. Brewer, Seven Ways to Strengthen and Improve the L3C, 25 REGENT U.L. REV. 329
(2012/2013).
4. Benefit corporations are another type of state law legal entity designed to facilitate social
enterprise. Most benefit corporation legislation requires the entity to include a general charitable
purpose as part of its corporate purposes, but that general charitable purpose need not be the
primary, or even a significant, purpose for the organization. Typically, the traditional standard of
care applicable to the board of directors of a business corporation is amended to provide that the
board of the benefit corporation should take into account the effect of corporate actions on
consumers, labor, the community and the environment. Unlike the L3C, there is no limitation on
profit motive for a benefit corporation. For more information on benefit corporations, see J. Haskell
Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certification and Benefit Corporation
Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise:
Comparing the State Statutes (May 1, 2014) (unpublished chart), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556.
5. See Nan Stone et al., The MBA Drive for Social Value: Five Trends Boosting Social
Benefit Content at U.S. Business Schools, BRIDGESPAN GROUP (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://www.bridgespan.org/Publications-and-Tools/Career-ProfessionalDevelopment/NonprofitCareers/The-MBA-Drive-for-Social-Value.aspx#.VF1P9odM5wy.
An
informal review of Business Week’s top 25 business schools indicates that 23 of the 25 had courses
in social impact investing; the other two schools had significant offerings in the social enterprise
field, so impact investing might be covered in other courses. Id.
6. See, e.g., Charles R. Bronfman, Jeffrey R. Solomon & Michael Edwards, Should
Philanthropies Operate Like Businesses?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052970204554204577024313200627678.
7. See, e.g., Lori Kozlowski, Impact Investing: The Power of Two Bottom Lines, FORBES
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorikozlowski/2012/10/02/impact-investing-the-powerof-two-bottom-lines/.
8. Eric A. Posner & Anup Malani, The Case for For-Profit Charities (Univ. of Chi. Law
and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928976; but see, Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1213 (2010); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 819 (2012). See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387 (2014).
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a subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House
of Representatives, led by Representative Wright Patman, held a series
of hearings uncovering abuses in the private foundation sector and
reviewing the impact of those abuses on the economy (the “Patman
hearings”).9
Many of the abuses uncovered in the Patman hearings involved
private foundation entanglement in operating businesses and related
investment opportunities. A report later issued by the Senate Finance
Committee in 1965 detailed a common tax planning strategy used by
wealthy families.10 The family would transfer a controlling voting
interest in the family business to a private foundation but retain the nonvoting equity interests in the business that represented a significant
portion of the value of the company. Generally, members of the family
would control the voting interests by sitting on the governing body of
the private foundation. This strategy preserved family control over the
business, retained the vast majority of the value of the company in
private hands, and generated a charitable income tax deduction, with
estate and gift tax deductions to boot.11 The family could then cause the
private foundation to use its assets to make speculative investments,12 to
provide capital for related businesses through loans or equity
investments,13 and to engage in anti-competitive behavior.14 The
foundation’s governing body would focus primarily upon the
maintenance and growth of these family business interests, at the
expense of the charitable endeavors that formed the basis for the private

9. The results of the Patman hearings were published in three separate installments (the
“Patman Reports”). CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG.,
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, FIRST
INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT or FIRST INSTALLMENT];
CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, SECOND
INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 2 or SECOND INSTALLMENT];
CHAIRMAN’S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, THIRD INSTALLMENT
(Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 3 or THIRD INSTALLMENT]. Indeed, this
discussion reaches even further back. For an excellent discussion of the history of private
foundations in the United States, see Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s
Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093
(2001).
10. See 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
11. Id. at 15-16.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 15-16.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/2

4

Waterhouse Wilson: Better Late Than Never

2015]

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

489

foundation’s tax-exempt status.15
The private foundation abuses detailed in the Patman hearings
generated significant controversy and spurred Congress to curb the
relationship between private foundations and affiliated businesses and
families. In 1965, the Senate Finance Committee, based in part on upon
the abuses uncovered in the Patman hearings, suggested a series of
excise taxes16 that were designed to combat private foundation
excesses.17 Many of these suggestions were passed into law,18 each of
which was designed to combat a particular abuse detailed in the Patman
hearings and later in the 1965 Report.19 In total, Congress enacted five
penalty excise taxes,20 which now form Chapter 42 of the Internal
Revenue Code, known as the “private foundation excise tax rules.”21
These excise taxes are designed to prohibit and penalize private
foundation behaviors deemed by Congress to be undesirable.
Of the five excise taxes, Code Section 4943, the excess business
holdings rule, was aimed specifically at curbing the entanglement of
private foundations and related businesses.22 As described more fully in

15. Id.
16. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an excise tax as “[a] tax imposed on the manufacture,
sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on an occupation or activity (such as a license tax
or an attorney occupation fee).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 15(c) (9th ed. 2009). West’s Tax Law
Dictionary takes a broader view, stating that the term “[m]ay be applied to most taxes except
income tax or property tax. In general, the term means a tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of
goods or with respect to an occupation or activity.” ROBERT SELLERS SMITH & ADELE TURGEON
SMITH, WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY § E2030 (Westlaw 2015). In this particular case, it is a
penalty in the form of an excise tax, which is designed to deter or punish a private foundation for an
undesirable activity. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S.
2012).
17. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1 at 26-30.
18. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
19. For a good discussion of the abuses identified by the Patman hearings and how the
various excise taxes overlap in various ways to address these abuses, see Richard Schmalbeck,
Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59 (2004).
20. In addition to the Section 4943 excise tax on excess business holdings, the other four
private foundation penalty excise taxes are as follows: (1) Section 4941 governs self-dealing
transactions between a private foundation and certain disqualified persons; (2) Section 4942
prohibits a foundation from accumulating its income indefinitely by requiring the foundation to
make minimum distributions for charitable purposes annually; (3) Section 4944 penalizes
speculative investments that jeopardize a foundation’s charitable purposes; and (4) Section 4945
taxes expenditures made for non-charitable purposes. In addition to the five penalty excise taxes,
Congress also imposed an excise tax on the net investment income of a private foundation. See 26
U.S.C. § 4940 (2012). This investment income excise tax was not intended as a penalty, but as a
mechanism for funding the enforcement of the other penalty excise taxes.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
22. Except as otherwise noted, all references to the “Code” or to a “Section” mean the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as from time to time amended.
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Part III, Code Section 4943 limits a private foundation’s ability to hold
equity interests in those business entities that are also owned by
individuals and entities affiliated with the foundation. The amount and
nature of the equity interest that a foundation may hold in a business
varies with the type of business entity. The statutory language of Code
Section 4943 sets forth fairly detailed rules limiting the equity holdings
of a private foundation in a business corporation.23 It then provides only
very general rules regarding a private foundation’s holdings in
unincorporated entities, such as trusts, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships,24 leaving Treasury to fill in the details by regulation.
The focus on corporate holdings in Code Section 4943 reflects the
results of the Patman hearings and the 1965 Report, both of which detail
myriad abuses involving foundation investment in business corporations.
As detailed in Part II, virtually none of the testimony in the Patman
hearings involved partnerships. As most of the perceived abuse
uncovered by the Patman hearings was in the corporate sector, the
dichotomy in statutory treatment between corporate ownership of an
operating business and “direct” ownership of a business (including sole
proprietorships, partnerships, fractional interests, and trusts) sufficed at
the time for purposes of the statute.25
Code Section 4943 addressed the business and investment world as
Congress found it in 1969. Given the differential between corporate
income tax rates and individual income tax rates at the time,26 most
businesses were set up as corporations. The income from a general
partnership was passed through to the partners and taxed at the higher
23. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2) (2012).
24. Id. § 4943(c)(3). (“The permitted holdings of a private foundation in any business
enterprise which is not incorporated shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary. Such regulations shall be consistent in principle with paragraphs (2) and (4), except
that . . . [then setting forth general guidance for partnerships, sole proprietorships, and any other
unincorporated entity].”). See infra Part III for more details regarding this provision.
25. As an example of the view that partnerships constituted “direct” ownership, see 1965
REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (“Many private foundations have become deeply involved in the active
conduct of business enterprises. Ordinarily, the involvement takes the form of ownership of a
controlling interest in one or more corporations which operate businesses; occasionally, a
foundation owns and operates a business directly.”); see also id. at 30.
26. From 1954 to 1964 (during which the Patman hearings occurred), the maximum federal
corporate tax rate was 52%, while the maximum individual rate was 91%. From 1965 to 1978, when
the Chapter 42 excise taxes were passed, the maximum federal corporate rate was 48%, while the
maximum individual rate was 70%. These rates began to drop over the next few years, although the
maximum individual rate was still higher than the corporate rate. See the incredibly helpful chart of
historical income tax rates in JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 6-7 (4th ed.
2012).
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individual rates in effect at the time, and of course, the general partners
had no liability protection. At the time, limited partnerships, the income
from which was also passed through and taxed at the higher individual
rates, sharply curtailed management participation by passive investors as
the price to be paid for enhanced liability protection.27 As a result,
general and limited partnerships were used rarely at the time of the
Patman hearings and primarily in specialized areas, such as real estate or
oil and gas.28 Foundation involvement with these relatively rare and
generally small scale (at least comparatively) investment entities was not
the source of abuse that Patman had targeted in his hearings—not when
compared with the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation’s ownership and
control of Standard Oil.29
But then the world changed.
Wyoming passed the first limited liability company (“LLC”) statute
in 1977,30 throwing the tax world into disarray. The Code contemplated
a business world with two primary business entities, corporations and
partnerships. The LLC challenged that dichotomy: here was an entity
with the liability protection of a corporation and the management
flexibility of a partnership. With the Tax Reform Act of 1986, individual
income tax rates fell below the combined corporate rate for the first time
since the inception of the income tax,31 making the pass-through taxation
of partnerships increasingly more attractive from an income tax
perspective.32
27. Historically, a limited partner was supposed to be a passive investor in the partnership. If
a limited partner exercised too much control over the partnership, he could be deemed a general
partner and lose the benefit of limited liability. At the time of the original passage of Chapter 42,
most states would have been working under the original version of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act (“ULPA”), passed in 1916. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916). Later revisions of ULPA came in
1976 and in 1985, which loosened but did not abolish the limitations on limited partnership
involvement in management. The 2001 revision to ULPA, however, did away with the control
limitation; but that revision was well after both the 1986 re-codification of the Internal Revenue
Code, which brought lower individual rates, and after the check-the-box rules of 1997. UNIF. LTD.
P’SHIP ACT (2001) (amended 2013). For further information on the limited partnership control rule,
see Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule
Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability As Well As Full General
Partner Liability?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667 (2004). See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, JEFFREY M.
LIPSHAW, ELIZABETH S. MILLER & JOSHUA P. FERSHEE, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES
(5th ed. 2013).
28. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1459, 1463-66, 1517-18 (1998).
29. See PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v. See also 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
30. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 577 (codified
as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103 (repealed 2010)).
31. See Kwall, supra note 26.
32. Prior to 1986, corporate rates were generally lower than individual rates, and often

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2

492

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:485

In 1986, however, it was not entirely clear that LLCs were entitled
to this newly advantageous pass-through taxation regime.33 Over time,
the Code adapted to the existence of LLCs, primarily through the
adoption of the “check-the-box” regulations effective January 1, 1997,
which finally clearly allowed LLCs to take advantage of partnership tax
structure.34 Since that time, the LLC has, by and large, found its place in
the Code.
Or has it? There are vestiges of the old tax world left, specifically
including the private foundation excise tax on excess business holdings
under Code Section 4943. To this day, the fundamental structure of
Code Section 4943 remains virtually untouched.35 The distinction
between corporations and “direct ownership” entities, such as
partnerships, remains, as does the deferral to Treasury to promulgate
regulations on the application of Code Section 4943 to non-corporate
entities. Neither the statute nor the regulations has been updated to take
into account private foundation ownership of LLCs.
At the same time, the percentage allocation of private foundation
endowments to alternative investments strategies has grown,36 and LLCs
significantly so. See id. at 5 n.26. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and until 1993, individual rates
were slightly lower than corporate rates (1987: 40% to 38.5%; 1988-1990: 34% to 28%; 1991-1992:
34% to 31%). See id. at 7. After 2003, the individual rates slightly exceeded the corporate rates once
again. See id. This, of course, does not take into account the effects of alternative taxation regimes
on dividends or capital gains.
33. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race
Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1199-1205 (1995).
34. See Susan Kalinka, The Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law After “Check-theBox,” 57 LA. L. REV. 715, 719-20 (1995). For discussion on the check-the-box rule for entity
classification, see infra Part III.E.1.
35. Congress has amended Code Section 4943, but not extensively. Code Section 4943 was
amended as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, to extend its
application to supporting organizations and donor advised funds and to increase the amount of the
tax. Earlier, there were corrections in 1969, 1976, 1980, 1984, most of which address grandfathering
and correction.
36. The 2012 Council on Foundations–Commonfund Study of Investments for Private
Foundations showed fairly strong returns for alternative investment strategies:
Within the broad category of alternative strategies, distressed debt returned 14.7 percent,
followed by an 8.0 percent gain from marketable alternative strategies (hedge funds,
absolute return, market neutral, long/short, 130/30, event driven and derivatives). Just 30
basis points behind at 7.7 percent was private equity (LBOs, mezzanine and M&A funds,
and international private equity). Returns from other subcategories were private equity
real estate (non-campus), at 6.7 percent; venture capital, at 6.5 percent; energy and
natural resources, at 4.6 percent; and commodities and managed futures, at 1.3 percent.
Press Release, Commonfund Inst., Study Finds Private Foundations Rebuilding Assets After
Recession Declines (Sept. 26, 2013), available at https://www.commonfund.org/InvestorResources/
CommonfundNews/Documents/2012%20CCSF%20Press%20Release%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
The
collective allocation of the 140 participating foundations (representing $78.7 billion in collective
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have grown to be the primary choice of entity for many of these
alternative investments.37 In addition, single member LLCs are
commonly used as a liability blocker for those activities that a private
foundation does not wish to undertake directly.38 Therefore, the lack of
clarity in the treatment of LLCs under Code Section 4943 has grown to
pose a significant practical problem for those private foundations39 that
oversee a diverse investment portfolio.
Updating a provision that governs a small segment of the taxexempt organization world might not be at the top of Treasury’s to-do
list. That being said, changes in the investment world, the nonprofit
sector, and the Code have brought new attention to Section 4943.
Moreover, the fundamental question asked in the 1960s and answered in
part by the passage of Code Section 4943—how much should the
charitable sector and business world intersect?—is as relevant now as it
was then. With the evolution of the investment theory and the renewed
focus on the issue of the interaction between business and charity, finally
addressing the manner in which LLCs are treated under Section 4943 is
a change that is better late than never.
Part I of this Article traces the historical development of Code
Section 4943 and the business entanglement issues that the Code Section
was designed to combat. It then discusses developments in the law that
occurred after the passage of Section 4943 that have implications for its
structure, most importantly the introduction of the LLC. Part II describes
the current statutory scheme of Section 4943, and the ambiguity in the
manner in which it applies, and the practical problems and abuses that
potentially arise from this ambiguity. In Part III, the Article reviews
various options for clarifying the treatment of Section 4943 and
evaluates them in light of the ongoing debate regarding the intersection
of charity and business. This Article concludes, in Part IV, with a
recommendation for change that provides administrative clarity and
minimizes the possibility of abuse while allowing for modern investment
assets) to alternative strategies was 42%, down from 44% the prior year. This included an allocation
across all institutions of 22% to private equity of all types and 39% to marketable alternative
strategies, such as hedge funds. Id.
37. The LLC has been the primary entity of choice for new businesses since as early as 2004.
See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of
New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs
Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 466-78 (2010).
38. The IRS recently confirmed that a donation directly to a single member LLC that is
wholly owned by a private foundation or other eligible charity may qualify for a Section 170
income tax deduction. I.R.S. Notice 2012-52, 2012-35 I.R.B. 317.
39. With the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, this problem now extends to
donor advised funds and supporting organizations. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(e)-(f) (2012).
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practices.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of the Private Foundation Excise Taxes
1. Preliminary Discussions
Private foundations have been a part of American philanthropy in
one form or another since roughly the turn of the century; criticism of
the American private foundation has been around for about that long as
well. The beginnings of the modern private foundation can be found in
the efforts of turn-of-the-century industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie
and John D. Rockefeller. Carnegie’s endowment, the Carnegie
Corporation, was founded in 1911, and the Rockefeller Foundation
followed shortly thereafter in 1913.40 It did not take long for the
criticism to start—in 1913, President William Howard Taft established a
commission (known as the Walsh Commission, after its chairman, Frank
P. Walsh) to hold hearings on these newly formed vehicles for private
philanthropy.41
The Walsh Commission eventually issued a report that roundly
criticized private foundations as abusive and designed primarily to
concentrate power and influence rather than further philanthropic
goals.42 The report did suggest a number of restrictions on these private
philanthropic entities, including limitations on investments and
accumulations of income.43
Congress did not adopt any of these changes; rather, they passed
legislation authorizing the personal income tax deduction for charitable
contributions in 1917 and extended the deduction to corporations in
1938.44 It is likely not pure coincidence that the number of private
foundations in existence grew dramatically immediately thereafter.45 The
ensuing rapid growth of business activity by private foundations did not
go unnoticed, as the first version of the unrelated business income tax
was passed in 1939.46
40.
41.
42.
43.

Crimm, supra note 9, at 1103-04.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1105; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INDUS. RELATIONS, 64TH CONG., INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1916).
44. Crimm, supra note 9, at 1105, 1107.
45. Id. at 1107
46. Id.
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President Harry S. Truman’s tax message to Congress on January
23, 1950, criticized foundations as “a cloak for business ventures.”47
Later that year, Congress updated the unrelated business income tax,
made an attempt at regulating self-dealing transactions, required
additional public disclosure, and tried to prohibit excessive
accumulations of income.48 This set of reforms has been described by
one commentator as “broader than it was deep” and “largely
ineffective.”49 Most certainly, these reforms did not stem the tide of
concern over the growing influence of private foundations.
2. The Patman Hearings
In 1961, Representative Wright Patman initiated a survey of 534
private foundations.50 This study was adopted as a project of the Small
Business Committee as part of the 87th Congress51 and formed the basis
for what would become later become the Patman Report, a multi-volume
report cataloguing myriad real and perceived private foundation abuses.
In the transmittal letter forwarding an interim report from his
subcommittee to the full House Small Business Committee,
Representative Patman noted that 111 of the 534 foundations “owned
10% or more of at least one class of stock in one or more of 264
different corporations” as of the end of 1960, including Ford, Eli Lilly,
and Kellogg.52 After reciting this statistic, Patman stated,
“[u]nquestionably, the economic life of our Nation has become so
intertwined with foundations that unless something is done about it they
will hold a dominant position in every phase of American life.”53 Patman
went on to compare private foundations to the Standard Oil monopolies
broken up by the Roosevelt administration, instituting the modern
antitrust era.54
In his transmittal letter, Representative Patman noted the significant
47. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
48. Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 60 n.4.
49. Id. In the 1965 Report, Treasury agreed, stating that the 1950 self-dealing rules provided
“unsatisfactory results,” and the 1950 rules on minimum distributions were “inadequate as well as
difficult and expensive to administer.” 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 17, 25.
50. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
51. Id. at 1. The authorizing resolution was passed at the first meeting of the committee in
1962. See 108 CONG. RECORD 520 (1962).
52. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v.
53. Id.
54. Id. The transmittal letter specifically highlights the private foundations created by the
Rockefeller family and the holdings of those different foundations in Standard Oil and related
entities. Id.
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amount of lost federal revenue attributable to the tax-exempt status of
private foundations.55 Patman argued that the lost tax revenues were not
justified by the charitable use because the donor could
by a loan or exchange, secure a return of assets that have been donated
should the occasion arise, that he can secure additional capital when
needed, at ‘reasonable’ rates; that foundation funds have been used to
help a donor when he found himself in a proxy fight; and foundation
funds have been used to confer benefits on employees of companies, a
56
substantial competitive advantage.

Many of these issues could be addressed—and were, in fact addressed—
by the stricter regulation of related party transactions.57 The Patman
Report clearly discussed self-dealing transactions such as foundation
lending, capital investments, use of foundation services on a preferable
basis, and sales that were not at fair market value.58
Even if such transactions had not occurred or had occurred on an
arm’s length basis, Representative Patman would still have been
troubled. The interrelationship between a private foundation and
business was, in and of itself, the issue. The Patman Report identified
the use of private foundations to perpetuate and consolidate corporate
control as a subject in need of “careful examination.”59 The report noted
that foundation money and other assets were used to carry on proxy
fights, citing specific examples that had occurred in 1960 and 1961.60 In
addition, the Patman Report expressed concern about the unfair
55. Id. at vi. For example, Gulf Oil created a foundation to hold 100% of the voting common
stock of Pontiac Refining Corporation, then valued at $32 million. In 1960, it had an income of
$750,000, of which $380,000 was expended for tax-exempt purposes. Id.
56. Id.
57. Section 4941, passed in 1969 as part of the same set of private foundation excise taxes
that included Section 4943, now prohibits all self-dealing transactions (subject to limited statutory
exceptions), even if those transactions are fair and reasonable to the foundation and at fair market
value. Prior to the enactment of Section 4941, then Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 loosely regulated these transactions by providing that a trust holding amounts for charitable
purposes could not lend without “adequate security” and a “reasonable rate of interest”; pay
“excess” compensation; make services available on a “preferential basis”; make “substantial
purchases” of property for more than “adequate consideration”; sell “substantial” property for less
than “adequate consideration”; or enter into any other transaction that would result in a “substantial
diversion” of assets to the grantor, their family members, or certain controlled corporations.
Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 321, 64 Stat. 906, 954-56.
58. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
59. Id.
60. Id. The First Installment of the Patman Report notes that the Albert A. List Foundation
was involved in a fight for control of the Endicott Johnson Corporation in 1960. In addition, the
Fred M. Kirby Foundation was involved in a control struggle over Alleghany Corporation in 1961.
Id.
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competition that can occur when an operating business is able to
function in a tax-advantaged environment.61
Probably the most significant concern was the ability to run a
corporation relatively unfettered by the needs of shareholders. This
concern could not be addressed solely through the regulation of selfdealing transactions.62 If the governing body of a family foundation that
owns the stock in the family corporation is largely comprised of
individuals affiliated with the family corporation personally, there is
little opportunity for independent oversight. The family foundation, as
the sole or majority shareholder of the family company, was, as a
practical matter, unlikely to pursue remedies for a breach of the fiduciary
duties of its own board or the board of the controlled corporation. The
general public, as the primary beneficiary of the charitable activities of
the foundation, could generally only act through the various states’
Attorneys General63—again, not something that was likely to occur as a
practical matter. As a result, the “[p]ossible conflict of interest between
the duties of the foundation’s directors and trustees and their interest as
officers, stockholders, and employees of business corporations whose
stock is controlled by the foundation” would not necessarily be
addressed by the regulation of self-dealing transactions as a matter of
either state or federal law.64
The Patman Report recommended an immediate moratorium on the
recognition of additional tax-exempt foundations for a number of
reasons, including the “rapidly increasing concentration of economic
power in foundations” and the competitive advantages of foundationcontrolled businesses over the small businessman.65 Specifically, the
Patman Report recommended that “[t]ax-exempt foundations should be
prohibited from engaging in business directly or indirectly. Foundations
controlling corporations engaged in business, through the extent of stock
ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed to be
61. “A foundation-controlled business, with no stockholders to worry about could
conceivably operate at a loss for some time in order to eliminate a competitor. It is suggested that in
periods of recession destructive competition could result from foundation controlled enterprises
since making a profit, paying dividends, and maintaining equity credit are of little concern to a
privately controlled, tax-exempt foundation.” Id. at 15.
62. Id.
63. At common law, individual members of the general public do not have standing to
enforce the public purpose of a charitable entity. See generally Iris Goodwin, Donor Standing to
Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (2005).
64. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 16. In the recitation of subjects in need of careful
examination, the Patman Report extensively discusses corporation holdings but never specifically
mentions the use of partnerships.
65. Id. at 1.
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engaged in that business.”66 Patman suggested limiting a foundation’s
holdings to no more than three percent of the stock of a corporation,
prohibiting a foundation from voting stock, and setting standards for
foundation behavior in proxy fights.67
The abuses discussed in the Patman Report occurred almost
exclusively in the context of the foundation-controlled business
corporations—there is almost never a discussion of partnerships as
controlled entities.68 Rather, partnerships were seen as an example of
“direct” or “joint” ownership by a donor in his individual capacity. This
lack of concern over the role of partnerships and similar entities is
demonstrated by the data tables provided in the later installments of the
Patman Report.69 The Patman Report summarized the information that it
gathered as it reviewed the 534 foundations it studied.70 While the data is
broken down to show detailed information about corporate holdings,71
there is no specific data regarding partnership holdings.
It is not even clear from the presentation of the schedules as to how
partnership income or ownership is taken into account.72 Schedule 1 of
the Patman Report broke down the gross receipts of the 534 foundations
studied by the type of income. Partnership income might have been
reported in the “other income” column, which may include partnership
distributions, although pass-through items from partnership distributions
of interest, dividends, rents and royalties, or gain and loss from property
transactions also may be reported in those respective columns.73
Similarly, Schedule 5 broke down the investments of the 534
foundations by asset type. Partnerships are not mentioned specifically—
they might have been lumped with “other investments,”74 or the schedule
could have looked through the partnership entity and reported the
underlying partnership assets in their appropriate columns on the rest of
66. Id. at 133.
67. Id.
68. By the author’s personal count, the word “partnership” was used no more than three
times in the First Installment of the Patman Report. See generally id.
69. See PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9; PATMAN REPORT 3, supra note 9.
70. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at v.
71. By way of example, Schedule 2 of the Patman Report sets forth “data regarding
corporations in which certain foundations failed to report their ownership of 10 percent or more of
each class of the corporation’s stock,” while Schedule 3 discusses “foundations’ ownership of 10
percent or more of any class of stock of any corporation.” Schedule 5, which details the asset
holdings of the foundations in question, specifically breaks out corporate holdings at both book and
market value. PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 86-113.
72. See generally id. at 21-37.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 86-113.
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the table. The note to Schedule 5, Column 8 does not even mention
partnership interests, stating:
The foundation’s assets consist of a variety of investments other than
securities. Land, real estate, inventories, equipment, patents, insurance
policies, works of art, etc. are examples of assets owned by
foundations, and their market values may be considerably greater than
75
the book values indicated by the foundation and used herein.

If we assume that partnership interests would have been reported as
“other investments” on Schedule 5, a quick review of the reported
numbers may indicate why partnership interests received little to no
attention in the Patman Report. Of the 534 foundations studied, only 18
(and generally, only the very largest) had total “other investments” in
excess of $1,000,000 in book value.76 By contrast, most of the
foundations had corporate stock over $1,000,000 in book value, and
almost all had corporate stock with a fair market value of over
$1,000,000. By the numbers, the source of the problem was clearly with
the corporate holdings of the foundations studied; partnership
investments were an afterthought.77
The Patman Report was published in three installments. The second
installment, issued in 1963,78 detailed the specific transactions of a
handful of foundations: the Baird Foundations, the Hessie Smith Noyes
Foundations, the Lawrence A. Wein Foundation, and the Harry B.
Helmsley Foundation. Of the multiple transactions described in the
second installment, only two sets of transactions involved a
partnership.79 In 1959, Lawrence A. Wien donated participating interests
in five partnerships to his foundation. The report’s objection to these
donations does not appear to involve control or investment issues; rather,
the concern was that Mr. Wien was able to shelter significant amounts of

75. Id. at 128 n.5.
76. Id. at 86-113. Schedule 5 states that, “[g]enerally, assets other than securities are shown
at book value.” Id. at 107.
77. One of the few mentions of partnerships comes in the recommendation section of the
Patman Report in the context of the treatment of S Corporations:
In the case of corporations that are treated like partnerships (Subchapter S, Chapter 1,
Internal Revenue Code), contributions to foundations should “pass through” to the
stockholders and be included pro rata as contributions by the stockholders personally. In
that way, the 20 percent and 30 percent limitations on contributions will be maintained.
At present, through the mechanics of Subchapter S (Chapter 1, Internal Revenue Code),
an extra 5 percent of the corporation’s income becomes deductible by the stockholders.
PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 134.
78. PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9.
79. Id. at 83-88.
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capital gain through the donations.80 Additionally, a partnership that
owned a hotel and leased it to an operating company, which had been
organized by and owned in part by Mr. Wein, made a series of donations
to Mr. Wein’s foundation. It does not appear that the Wein Foundation
owned any part of the partnership; rather, the implication appears to be
that Mr. Wein may have avoided receiving certain fees for legal services
by having the partnership make donations to his foundation instead.81 In
these few mentions of partnerships, the issue appears to be improper
benefits accruing to the donor (capital gains avoidance or assignment of
income) and not with the foundation’s participation in the partnership
itself.
3. The 1965 Treasury Report
In addition, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways
and Means Committee asked the Department of Treasury to examine
private foundation tax abuses and to report on its conclusions. On
February 2, 1965, Treasury forwarded its report and recommendations
for legislation to both Committees, which was then published by the
Senate Finance Committee.82 While the 1965 Report built upon many of
the abuses identified in the Patman hearings,83 Treasury’s study
encompassed a wider universe of private foundations. According to the
1965 Report, Treasury “conducted a special canvass of approximately
1,300 selected foundations,” more than double the amount studied by the
Patman Report.84
Like the Patman hearings before it, the 1965 Report highlighted a
number of areas of private foundation abuse, including “Foundation
Involvement in Business,”85 “Family Use of Foundations to Control
Corporate and Other Property,”86 and “Financial Transactions Unrelated
to Charitable Functions.”87
80. In each case, the partnership held a purchase money mortgage. They appear to be general
partnerships (although this is not entirely clear). Mr. Wein donated two 50% interests, a 99.09%
interest, a 20% interest, and a 2.5% interest. Id.
81. Id. at 81-82.
82. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1.
83. Id. at 2 n.5 (citing PATMAN REPORT, supra note 9; PATMAN REPORT 2, supra note 9;
PATMAN REPORT 3, supra note 9).
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 9. This portion of the discussion recommends a prohibition on borrowing, a
limitation on foundation investments similar to the approved list approach used for private trusts at
the time, and a prohibition on “trading activities and speculative practices.” Id. This discussion
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The discussion entitled “Foundation Involvement in Business”
described Treasury’s recommendations that would eventually form the
structure of Code Section 4943. Among the problems identified as
resulting from foundation involvement in business enterprises were
competition with for-profit enterprises, “opportunities and temptations
for subtle and varied forms of self-dealing” that would be beyond the
reach of what would become Code Section 4941,88 and a diversion of
management attention from charitable activities to commercial
enterprises.89 As a result, the 1965 Report proposed prohibiting
foundation ownership “either directly or through stock holdings, 20
percent or more” of an unrelated business.90
The 1965 Report catalogued the competitive advantages to a
business arising out of the involvement of a related private foundation.
There is, of course, the fact that the foundation is an income-tax-exempt
entity. Beyond that, the 1965 Report noted that a foundation could
essentially accumulate income within a controlled corporation.91 Even
though Treasury simultaneously proposed a mandatory minimum
distribution rule for foundation, the 1965 Report noted that those
distributions would apply to the foundation’s income and not to the
undistributed income of the controlled corporation.92 A decision to
accumulate income within the business for its own capital needs (or
simply so it does need to be distributed) runs counter to the need to fund
charity currently. Similarly, a foundation, as shareholder, may be willing
to continue to fund or to tolerate a business that is producing losses
longer than for-profit shareholders or a third party lender might be
willing to consider, at the ultimate expense of charity.93
While the 1965 Report highlighted a number of abuses of business
assets akin to subtle acts of self-dealing that might not be captured by
what would become Code Section 4941, Treasury discussed at length
another concern with foundation ownership of operating business
interests. In the 1965 Report, Treasury set forth its rationale for why
would form the basis for current Code Section 4944 regarding jeopardizing investments.
88. Id. at 34 (“However broadly drawn the restrictions upon self-dealing may be, many of the
conflicts of interest arising in this area are likely to be sufficiently obscure or sufficiently beyond
the realms of reasonable definition to escape the practical impact of the limitations.”).
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. It is unclear whether this 20% included holdings by affiliated persons at the date of
publishing—it may not. Id.
91. The 1965 Report does not note that the accumulated earnings tax (currently found in
Code Sections 531-537), would have worked to limit accumulations within a C Corporation to some
degree. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 531-537 (1954).
92. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
93. Id. at 35.
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private foundations should continue to be subsidized through taxexemption and should not be subject to term limits.94 Treasury believed
that “the private foundation is uniquely qualified to provide a basis for
individual experimentation and the exercise of creative imagination.”95
The charitable activities of a private foundation are not limited in scope;
it can fund whatever charitable projects may capture the interest of the
foundation’s governing body. A private foundation is “easily
established” and “inherently flexible.”96 As such, it is particularly suited
“for use by those who are concerned with, and devoted to the
development of, new areas of social improvement.”97 With the support
of a private foundation, “[n]ew ventures can be assisted, new areas
explored, new concepts developed, new causes advanced.”98
Underlying this rationale for the preferential treatment of private
foundation is the assumption that the foundation’s governing body is
active and involved in setting and pursuing the foundation’s charitable
mission. If, instead, the governing body is consumed by managing the
foundation’s business holdings, then less time will be spent on the
innovative programming that is the unique province of the private
foundation.99 “Business may become the end of the organization;
charity, an insufficiently considered and mechanically accomplished
afterthought.”100
Treasury’s proposal to address the issue of foundation entanglement
in commercial affairs at the expense of attention to charitable endeavors
involved “an absolute limit on the involvement of private foundations in
active business.”101 The proposal would prevent foundations from
owning 20% or more of the combined voting power or the total equity of
a corporation.102 Similarly, the 20% prohibition would apply to
ownership “by a foundation, either directly or through a partnership, of a
20-percent or larger interest in the capital or profits of such a
business.”103 The 1965 Report’s proposal, however, did not attribute to
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also id. at 12-13 (private foundations “enrich and strengthen the pluralism of our
social order” and “provided impetus for change within the structure of American philanthropy”).
98. Id. at 13.
99. See id. at 35 (“[t]he charitable pursuits that constitute the real reason for [a private
foundation’s] existence may be submerged by the pressures and demand of the commercial
enterprise”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id.
103. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss3/2

18

Waterhouse Wilson: Better Late Than Never

2015]

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

503

the foundation the ownership of interests held by donors, foundation
managers, or their family members; rather, only interests held for the
benefit of the foundation through trusts or other corporations would be
attributed up to the foundation.104
Interestingly, the retention of family control over business property
was discussed separately from the issue of foundation involvement in
commercial activities. The 1965 Report, after discussing the fact that
donors often retain control of corporate holdings contributed to a private
foundation, noted that “[s]imilar problems arise when a donor
contributes an interest in an unincorporated business or an undivided
interest in property, in which he or related parties continue to have
substantial rights.”105 Treasury expressed the concern that the private
interests of the other equity holders of the business property would
trump the interests of charity.106 Treasury’s solution at the time was to
propose that, if a donor and related parties retained control over
contributed assets, the gift of the business was not yet complete and the
charitable tax deductions associated with that contribution would be
delayed.107 For these purposes, control would be presumed if the donor
and related party owned 20% of the voting interest in a corporation or a
20% interest in an unincorporated business or other property.108 These
provisions were not enacted in 1969 and have not been enacted to this
day. Passive investing activities were excluded from the definition of
“business,” as these activities would not have caused the diversion of
attention away from charitable projects in the same manner as an active
business might.109
The 1965 Report also expressed significant concern over the
possibility that family members may have conflicting fiduciary duties to
the family company and the private foundation (not to mention personal
interest), which may be too subtle to be captured by the self-dealing
rules of Section 4941.110 Examples given in the 1965 Report include
hiring decisions in favor of friends and family, decisions regarding
104. Id. As discussed infra Part III.B, when Code Section 4943 was eventually passed, it also
attributed the holdings of donors, foundation managers, and their family members, as well as other
related parties, to the foundation for purposes of calculating the 20% permitted holdings rule. 26
U.S.C. § 4946(a) (2012).
105. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 41-45.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id. at 36-37.
110. See id. at 40-41 (“Similarly, rules concrete enough to possess real efficacy in the
prohibition of specific self-dealing practices cannot cope successfully and decisively with the subtle
and continuing conflicts of interest which arise in the family stock situation.”).
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accumulation of earnings and dividend policies, or liquidation of the
foundation’s interest in the business during difficult periods of time.111
With regard to unincorporated interests, the Report states:
Problems of the same nature arise where the donor contributes to a
private foundation an interest in an unincorporated business, or an
undivided interest in property, in which he or those related to him
retain substantial rights. Current tax deductions have been claimed, for
example, for contributions of rights in the air space over the donor’s,
water rights adjacent to a private beach which the donor owns, or
fractional interests in vacant land which the donor controls. Here
again, because of the donor’s close continuing connection with the
property, it is hardly realistic to expect the foundation to make
112
independent decisions about its use and disposition of the property.

This assumes that the donor is a foundation manager and, therefore,
owes fiduciary duties to both the foundation and the business entity
owned by the foundation. In each case, it requires such individual to be
in a position to control the activities of the business.
The emphasis on corporate abuses highlighted in the Patman
hearings continued in the 1965 Report. In the section highlighting selfdealing abuses, Treasury gave 12 examples of problematic
transactions113—ten of the 12 examples explicitly involve corporate
holdings.114 The other two examples involve real estate that may have
been owned directly by the foundation115—in neither case is ownership
through a partnership specifically mentioned, although it is possible.116
As with the Patman Report, Treasury compiled statistics regarding
the business holdings of the private foundations it reviewed. Of the
approximately 1,300 foundations studied, approximately 180 reported
ownership of 10% or more of one class of stock of a corporation.117 Of
these, 109 owned 20% or more of a corporation and 40% held a 100%

111. Id.
112. Id. at 41. Again, the 1965 Report does not specifically mention partnerships.
113. Id at 18-20.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 19-20. The two real estate examples are example 7 (real estate contributed to a
foundation and leased back to the donor) and example 8 (foundation uses contributions to construct
buildings leased back to the donors’ retail businesses).
116. Id. Similarly, in the section discussing foundation involvement in business, Treasury
provided six initial examples of significant business holdings by foundations—four of these
addressed multiple corporate holdings, one was unclear, and the last involved the sale and lease
back of the operating assets of 18 different businesses. Again, at no time does the 1965 Report
indicate that any of these are owned by partnerships explicitly. Id at 30-31.
117. Id. at 31.
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interest.118 The 1965 Report further described its findings regarding
foundation holdings in multiple corporations. It ended its description of
its findings with the statement, “[i]n other cases, of course, foundations
own and operate businesses directly,” with no further comment.119 All
three examples of abuse in this area cited by the 1965 Report involved
corporate holdings.120
In summary, Treasury stated that its
recommendations seek not only to end diversions, distractions, and
abuses, but to stimulate and foster the active pursuit of charitable ends
which the tax laws seek to encourage. Any restraints which the
proposal may impose on the flow of funds to private foundation will be
far outweighed by the benefits which will accrue to charity from the
removal of abuses and from the elimination of the shadow which the
121
existence of abuse now casts upon the private foundation area.

Thus, Code Section 4943 was originally designed not only to prevent
subtle acts of self-dealing and abuse but also to insure that the
foundation was appropriately focused on the charitable endeavors that
justified its tax-exempt status. As with the Patman Report, however, the
1965 Report focused primarily on abuses involving corporate ownership
and rarely discussed foundation ownership of affiliated partnerships.
4. Passage in 1969
The 1965 Report did not result in immediate legislation. The
private foundation reform discussion continued through the late 1960s,
culminating in the passage of the private foundation excise taxes
(specifically including the excess business holdings tax) in 1969.122
In 1969, Treasury forwarded to Congress a comprehensive tax
reform package, which included proposals for the private foundation
excise taxes.123 Specifically referencing the 1965 Report,124 Treasury
stated that a minority of private foundations “are being operated so as to
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also id. at 30 ([o]rdinarily, the involvement takes the form of ownership of a
controlling interest in one or more corporations that operate businesses; occasionally, a foundation
owns and operates a business directly”).
120. Id. at 39.
121. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
122. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
123. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., J. PUB. H. COMM. OF WAYS AND MEANS AND S. COMM. ON FIN.,
91ST CONG., 1 TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969). Note the Tax Reform
Proposal from Treasury appeared in multiple separate parts, which are referred to collectively herein
as the “Tax Reform Proposal.”
124. Id. at 26.
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bring private advantage to certain individuals, to delay passing on
directly benefits to charity for extended periods of time, and to involve
the foundation too greatly in the ownership and management of
commercial enterprises.”125 The Tax Reform Proposal cites involvement
in commercial enterprises generally as the issue to be addressed and not
simply involvement with businesses that are affiliated with the
foundation and its foundation managers.126 Treasury’s Tax Reform
Proposal further states that the private foundation excise taxes were
designed, in part, “to divorce the philanthropic aspects of foundations
from their control and management of business.”127
The portion of the Tax Reform Proposal that explains the private
foundation excise taxes begins as follows:
Private philanthropy plays a special and vital role in our society.
Beyond providing financial aid to areas which government cannot or
should not advance (such as religion), private philanthropic
organizations are uniquely qualified to initiate thought and action,
experiment with new and untried ventures, dissent from prevailing
attitudes, and act quickly and flexibly.
Private foundations have an important part in this work. . . . [T]hey
enable individuals or small groups to establish new charitable
endeavors and to express their own bents, concerns, and experience. In
128
doing so, they enrich the pluralism of our social order.

While the majority of private foundations were believed to be carrying
out these charitable functions, a small number of foundations were
operated “to bring private advantage to certain individuals” and “to
cause competitive disadvantage between businesses operated by
foundations and those operated by private individuals.”129 As with the
Patman hearings and the 1965 Report before it, the Tax Reform Proposal
identified four primary issues to be addressed: (1) competitive
disadvantage, (2) subtle forms of self-dealing, (3) deferral of benefits to
charity through accumulations in controlled corporations, and (4)
preoccupation by the foundation with business affairs.130
The technical explanation of the provision that would become

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41.
128. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., J. PUBLICATION H. COMM. OF WAYS AND MEANS AND S. COMM. ON
FIN., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., 3 TAX REFORM STUD. AND PROPOSALS 295 (Comm. Print 1969).
129. Id. at 295.
130. Id. at 296.
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Section 4943 is entitled “Limitation on Involvement in Business.”131 The
proposal would have prohibited a foundation from owning, directly or
indirectly, 20% or more of the combined voting power or 20% or more
of the equity of a corporation conducting an unrelated trade or
business.132 This appears to be the first time that the issue of voting
control versus economic interest is identified in the context of the
structure of Section 4943.
With regard to partnerships, the Tax Reform Proposal does provide
that “the direct or indirect ownership of a 20-percent or larger interest in
the capital or profits of an unincorporated business not substantially
related to the exempt functions of the owner foundation would also be
prohibited.”133 Other than this particular phrase, there is no separate
discussion of partnerships.134
5. Summary of Historical Materials
In summary, two things are clear from a review of the legislative
materials that preceded the enactment of Section 4943. First, Treasury
and Congress were concerned about private foundation involvement in
business not only because of the potential for improper benefits to
private individuals but also due to the potential for a private foundation
to focus its attention on its operating business holdings at the expense of
its charitable mission. These two concerns underscore Congress’
attempts to limit the ability of foundations to be involved in corporate
activities through the ownership of voting stock. Second, almost all of
the abuses highlighted in the legislative materials involved operating
businesses held in corporate form—which, given the economic and tax
structure in place at the time, made perfect sense. The almost nonexistent discussion of business holdings in unincorporated enterprises in
the legislative history, combined with the skeletal statutory provisions
governing unincorporated enterprises, leads one to believe that the
provisions that would address unincorporated entities—eventually
enacted as Code Section 4943(c)(3)—were practically an afterthought.

131. Id. at 301.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 301-02. The Tax Reform Proposal also clarifies that the 20% limitation would
apply to indirect as well as direct ownership, giving an example that would attribute stock held in
trust to the foundation to the extent of its beneficial interest in the trust. Id.
134. As a further indication that Treasury was not focused on the issue of partnerships, the
draft provisions that would define “disqualified person” under Code Section 4946 did not address
partnerships. The proposed rules specifically addressed corporations, trusts (including grantor
trusts), and estates but not partnerships or other unincorporated entities. Id. at 299.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2

508

B.

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:485

The Tax Code and LLCs

The taxation of a business entity under the Internal Revenue Code
is dictated by its classification as a partnership or an association under
Code Section 7701.135 Section 7701(a)(2) defines a partnership to
include a joint venture or “other unincorporated organization, through or
by means of which any business, financial operation or venture is carried
on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a
corporation . . . .”136 At the same time, Section 7701(a)(3) defines a
corporation to include an association.137 The question of whether an
entity is a corporation or partnership seemed easy enough (usually) if the
entity was, in fact, a corporation or a partnership under state law. The
question was not so clear with the introduction of LLC statutes, which
by definition were neither corporations nor partnerships.
When Wyoming introduced the first LLC statute in 1977,138 the
Code classified business entities as either associations or partnerships
based on a multi-factor test.139 The state law form of entity was not
determinative for federal tax purposes,140 although typically a state law
corporation would be an association and a general partnership formed
under the Uniform Partnership Act would be an unincorporated
organization.141
Prior to 1998, in the event of ambiguity, the regulations under
Section 7701 looked to see whether an entity had more of the
characteristics of a corporation or of a partnership when assigning
federal income tax classification. These factors were derived from a
135. 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012). Compare Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (1977) (at the time LLCs
come in) (“The Internal Revenue Code prescribes certain categories, or classes, into which various
organizations fall for purposes of taxation. These categories, or classes, include associations (which
are taxable as corporations), partnerships, and trusts.”) with Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (as
amended in 2014) (“The Internal Revenue Code prescribes the classification of various
organizations for federal tax purposes. Whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners
for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the
organization is recognized as an entity under local law.”).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2).
137. Id. § 7701(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (2013) (“The term partnership
means a business entity that is not a corporation under paragraph (b) of this section and that has at
least two members.”).
138. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 577
(codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103 (repealed 2010)).
139. An entity could also have been a trust as defined under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4,
although typically these are not business entities. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (1977). See also
Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed Business Tax
Structure, in BUS. TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005).
140. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1977).
141. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 5 (2001).
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series of cases, most notably the United States v. Kintner case142—as a
result, the entity classification regulations under Section 7701 in
existence prior to 1998 came to be known as the Kintner regulations.
The Kintner regulations analyzed business entities for classification
based on the following six characteristics:
1. Associates;
2. Objective to carry on a business and divide gains;
3. Continuity of life;
4. Centralized management;
5. Limited liability for entity debts; and
6. Free transferability of interests.

143

As both corporations and partnerships had, by definition, associates and
an objective to carry on a business and divide the profits, these first two
factors were generally not determinative for purposes of entity
classification.144 Rather, the last four factors—continuity of life,
centralized management, limited liability, and transferability—were the
keys to entity classification and were given equal weight.145 If an entity
had more “corporate” characteristics than “partnership” characteristics,
then it would be deemed to be a corporation for tax purposes; otherwise,
it would be a partnership.146
The typical state law corporation has continuity of life of its own
accord, while a general partnership technically dissolves on the
withdrawal of a shareholder, among other things.147 A corporation has
exclusive centralized management through its board of directors,148
while all general partners participate in management due to the agency
relationship contemplated in the Uniform Partnership Act.149 Of course,
shareholders are insulated from liability for corporate debts while

142. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (discussing a Montana medical
practice formed as a partnership that liquidated and reformed as an unincorporated association in an
attempt to obtain corporate tax classification).
143. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1977).
144. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2); see also JAMES S. EUSTICE & THOMAS BRANTLEY, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ¶ 2.04 (Westlaw 2015).
145. Larson v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159, 172-84 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
146. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1977).
147. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
148. Id. § 301.7701-2(c).
149. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
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general partners are personally liable for the debts of the partnership.150
Finally, corporate shareholders can typically trade their shares freely
absent a shareholder agreement to the contrary, while partnership
interests are typically not transferrable without the consent of the nontransferring partners.151
This facts and circumstances test of the Kintner regulations was an
administrative nightmare for the IRS and a source of both ambiguity and
opportunity for taxpayers. A creative lawyer could attempt to draft a
partnership agreement that had “corporate” characteristics.152 Even with
creative drafting, an entity was always susceptible to entity classification
review by the IRS—assuming, of course, the IRS had the resources to
find and audit, on a case-by-case basis, all of the taxpayers utilizing
creative drafting as a basis for entity classification.
In the face of this uncertainty, the Wyoming LLC was a statutory
attempt to create the mythical hybrid entity that had corporate liability
protection and federal partnership taxation without forcing lawyers to
opt into the preferred tax classification through creative drafting.153
Unfortunately, it took about a decade before the IRS confirmed that a
Wyoming LLC governed by the default statutory rules would be taxed as
a partnership. In the interim, Treasury unsuccessfully attempted to make
limited liability the most important factor in the classification, thus
making LLCs corporations by default.154 Finally, in Revenue Ruling 8876, the IRS ruled that a Wyoming LLC could qualify as a partnership for
federal tax purposes under Section 7701.155
In the interim, the uncertainty regarding the appropriate tax
classification of LLCs chilled any movement to enact LLC legislation
150. Id. § 301.7701-2(d). Because the general partner in a limited partnership still has
unlimited liability for partnership obligations, limited liability did not exist for a limited partnership
unless the general partner had no substantial assets that could be reached by creditors (i.e., it is an
undercapitalized “dummy” acting as an agent of the limited partners.) Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
151. Id. § 301.7701-2(e).
152. Thomas M. Hayes, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-the-Box
Treasury Regulations and Their Effect on Entity Classification, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147,
1156 (1997).
153. Hamill, supra note 139, at 296-97.
154. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75, 710 (Nov. 17, 1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301), repealed by
Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30; see also Carter G. Bishop & Robert R. Keatinge, An
Introduction, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 455 (2009); Hamill, supra note 139, at 296.
155. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988 C.B. 360. The ruling held that the LLC had the corporate
characteristic of a limited liability, but the terms of the Wyoming act ensured that the organization
did not have free transferability or continuity of life. The organization in the ruling was a managermanaged LLC and therefore deemed to have the corporate characteristic of centralized management.
Because the organization did not have a preponderance of corporate characteristics, it was taxed as a
partnership. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983)).
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nationwide. Between the passage in Wyoming in 1997 and Revenue
Ruling 88-76, only Florida passed an LLC statute in 1982.156 By 1998,
there were only 26 active Wyoming LLCs.157 With the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 88-76, however, the floodgates opened. In 1991,
Delaware adopted its LLC statute; by the end of 1996, all 51 U.S.
jurisdictions had LLC enabling legislation.158
Wyoming drafted its LLC statute to provide that any LLC formed
under the laws of that state would have more partnership characteristics
than corporate characteristics under the Kintner test, as the statutory
rules for lack of transferability and continuity of life would always
apply.159 In Florida and other states that based their legislation on the
Wyoming model, LLCs were also classified as partnerships, which was
confirmed by the IRS in a series of formulaic revenue rulings addressed
to each state statute.160
On the other hand, some state statutes gave the LLC the flexibility
to change the default rules that addressed the Kintner criteria. An LLC
formed in one of these flexible states could essentially choose corporate
or partnership status with careful drafting of its provisions regarding
transferability and continuity of life.161 As a result, it was possible in
these states to form LLCs that, “for non-tax purposes . . . in all
meaningful respects . . . [were] virtually indistinguishable from closely
held corporations, even though they could be structured to be taxed as
partnerships.”162 The IRS approved the classification of LLCs structure
in flexible jurisdictions as partnerships at the end of 1994.163
This entity classification system structure ultimately proved
unworkable. Each LLC classification determination was essentially a
facts-and-circumstances analysis. With the proliferation of LLC enabling
statutes, and therefore the proliferation of LLCs, after Revenue Rulings
88-76 and 95-10, the Kintner regulations were all but dead.
156. Fla. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act, 1982 Fla. Laws 82-177; see also Bishop & Keatinge, supra note
154, at 455; Hamill supra note 139, at 296.
157. RIBSTEIN, LIPSHAW, MILLER & FERSHEE, supra note 27, at 57.
158. Id. at 58; Hamill supra note 139, at 297.
159. RIBSTEIN, LIPSHAW, MILLER & FERSHEE, supra note 27, at 58; Hamill, supra note 139, at
297.
160. Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative
Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. LAW. REV. 44, 45 n.7-8, 49 n.35, 50 (1992); Thomas Earl Geu,
Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D.
LAW. REV. 467, 499 (1992).
161. Hamill, supra note 139, at 301.
162. PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & DANIEL L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS 12 (5th ed. 2012).
163. See Rev. Rul. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 168; Hamill, supra note 139, at 302.
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Ultimately, Treasury addressed the uncertainty caused by the
Kintner regime through the implementation of the “check-the-box”
regulations, which became effective as of January 1, 1997.164 In
summary, the check-the-box regulations set up default rules that initially
classify an organization as either a corporation or a partnership. Some
entities are allowed to elect a different classification then that assigned
to them by default by checking the appropriate box on Form 8832—thus,
the “check-the-box rules.”
If a business entity is not a trust or a disregarded entity,165 then “a
business entity with two or more members is classified for federal tax
purposes as either a corporation or a partnership.”166 A business entity
that is a corporation under state law, or that is an “association” as
defined in Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-3, will be treated as a
corporation for federal tax purposes.167 On the other hand, a partnership
is a business entity that is not a corporation and has at least two
members.168
An eligible entity that is not deemed to be a trust or a corporation
may “elect its classification for federal tax purposes.”169 An
unincorporated entity, such as an LLC, may elect to be treated as an
association (and therefore, a corporation under Section 7701(a)(3)). If it
does not elect association treatment, then a domestic unincorporated
entity with two or more members is automatically deemed to be a
partnership for federal tax purposes.170
Under these regulations, the Code does not specifically recognize
LLCs. Rather, a domestic LLC is treated as an unincorporated entity.
Under the check-the-box regulations, an LLC is deemed to be a
partnership for federal tax purposes by default and need do nothing

164. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 – § 301.7701-3 (as amended by T.D. 8697, 1997).
165. Disregarded entities include single member LLCs, which are treated essentially as a sole
proprietorship of the single member. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 2014).
166. Id. § 301.7701-2(a).
167. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2014). In addition, joint stock companies,
insurance companies, state chartered banks that hold FDIC insured deposits, business entities owned
by the government, and certain listed foreign entities are deemed to be corporations for federal tax
purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b).
168. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
169. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). The election is made by selecting association treatment on
Form 8832 (thus, “check the box”) and filing the form with the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
170. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). In contrast, a foreign unincorporated entity will be treated as an
association by default if all of the members of the entity have limited liability. Id. § 301.77013(b)(2)(i)(B). A member of a foreign unincorporated entity is treated as having limited liability if
“the member has no personal liability for the debts of or claims against the entity solely by reason of
being a member” under the law of the country of organization. Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii).
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further if that classification is acceptable. However, an LLC may
affirmatively “check the box” and elect to be treated as an association,
and therefore a corporation, for federal tax purposes.
As a result, an LLC is the master of its own tax destiny. As the
check-the-box election is purely mechanical, the LLC does not need to
draft its way into corporate or partnership status, as it needed to do prior
to 1997. Rather, the LLC can take full advantage of the flexibility
afforded to it under state law for management, liability, and
transferability purposes, while still being able to select between
partnership or corporate tax classification.
The election to be treated as a corporation or a partnership is
effective for “federal tax purposes.”171 There is no explicit statement in
the Regulations that check-the-box applies for purposes of the private
foundation excise taxes found in Chapter 42, including Section 4943.
III. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
A.

Private Foundations, Defined

Code Section 501(c)(3) exempts from federal income taxation
entities that are organized and operated exclusively for religious,
scientific, educational, literary, charitable, and other tax-exempt
purposes.172 Organizations described in Code Section 501(c)(3) are
further subdivided into two categories: private foundations and public
charities.173 A Section 501(c)(3) organization is deemed to be a private
foundation unless it proves that it is entitled to public charity status.174
There are, essentially, three ways for a Section 501(c)(3) organization to
achieve public charity status:
1.

Existing for a purpose that is deemed to be automatically worthy
of public charity status. This category includes hospitals, schools,
175
and churches as well as organizations that perform testing for
176
public safety,

2.

Meeting one of two alternative mathematical tests, both of which
are designed to measure the diversity of a charity’s financial

171. There are specific exceptions from the wholly owned entity rules for certain excise taxes
(not Chapter 42) and for employment taxes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(v); Temp. Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2T (as amended 2014).
172. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) & (c)(3) (2012).
173. 26 U.S.C. § 509(a) (2012).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 509(a)(1) (via 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v) (2012)).
176. Id. § 509(a)(4).
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support as a proxy for being responsive to the general public,
3.

or

Qualifying as a “supporting organization”—that is, an
organization that was created for the purpose of benefitting one or
178
more other public charities.

If an organization does not fall into one of these categories, it is treated
as a private foundation. The generic private foundation with which most
people may be familiar holds a substantial endowment of investment
assets that it obtained from a single person, family, or business, the
income from which is used to make grants to other charities.179
The consequences of being characterized as a private foundation
rather than a public charity can be substantial.180 One of the most serious
of these consequences is that private foundations are subject to the
Chapter 42 private foundation excise tax regime, including Code Section
4943.181 As currently enacted, Code Section 4943 imposes an excise tax
on the “excess business holdings” of any private foundation in a
“business enterprise.”182 The initial tax, on the foundation itself, equals
10% of the excess business holding.183 However, if the excess holding is
not corrected, the IRS may impose an additional excise tax of 200% of
the excess holding.184 Given these stakes, it is critical for a private
foundation to understand what constitutes an “excess business holding”
and a “business enterprise.” If either one of these elements is missing,

177. Id. § 509(a)(1) (via 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) and 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2)).
178. Id. § 509(a)(3) and § 509(f).
179. According to the Council on Foundations, in 2011 there were 73,764 private foundations
with more than $604 billion in assets and more than $45 billion in annual giving. Private
Foundations, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., http://www.cof.org/foundation-type/private-foundations (last
visited March 29, 2015). By way of example, the largest private foundation in the United States is
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with an endowment in excess of $37 billion according to its
2012 annual report. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012),
available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Reports.
180. Classification as a private foundation may also have a negative impact on a donor’s
charitable income tax deduction under Section 170. Very generally, a donor’s income tax deduction
is subject to a number of limitations, including an annual limitation in allowable deduction based on
the donor’s modified adjusted gross income and a decrease in the amount of the charitable
deduction for appreciated property. For gifts to a private foundation, a donor’s deduction may be
limited to 20% of the donor’s adjusted gross income (as opposed to 50% or 30% for gifts to or for
the use of a public charity), and the donor’s deduction may be limited to basis of certain types of
appreciated property (as opposed to fair market value reduced by short term capital gain for gifts of
appreciated property to a public charity.) See generally 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(D) & (e).
181. 26 U.S.C. § 4943 (2012).
182. Id. § 4943(a)(1).
183. Id. When originally passed in 1969, the rate was 5%; it was increased to 10% in 2006 as
part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §101(b), 120 Stat. 780.
184. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(b).
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then the foundation is not liable for the Section 4943 excise tax.
If a business entity is not a “business enterprise,” then the excess
business holding rules do not apply to the private foundation’s
ownership of that entity.185 The term “business enterprise” is defined in
the negative, specifically excluding functionally related businesses (as
defined in Code Section 4942(j)(4))186 and any trade or business of
which 95% of the income is passive.187 As a result, a business enterprise
generally means an unrelated, active trade or business, regardless of
choice of state law entity.
The term “excess business holding” is defined with reference to the
concept of a “permitted holding.” A permitted holding is the amount of
an interest in a business enterprise that a private foundation may own
without incurring the excise tax. By definition, then, an “excess business
holding” is the amount of ownership in a business enterprise that
exceeds permitted holdings.188 The amount of a foundation’s permitted
holdings depends upon two factors: the type of business enterprise and
the holdings of certain individuals affiliated with the private
foundation.189 As a general rule, the foundation must aggregate its
holdings in a business enterprise with the holdings of certain affiliated
individuals and entities, known as “disqualified person,” in order to
calculate its permitted holdings.190 This prevents the foundation or its
related parties from exerting control over the business enterprise through
collective or indirect action.
From there, the definition of permitted holdings historically

185. Id. § 4943(d)(3).
186. A functionally related business is either (1) a trade or business that is not unrelated within
the meaning of Code Section 513 or (2) “an activity which is carried on within a larger aggregate of
similar activities . . . which is related . . . to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 U.S.C. §
4942(j)(4) (2012).
187. For these purposes, passive income is defined with reference to the unrelated business
income tax sections of 26 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1), (2), (3), and (5) (2012), as well as the income from
the sales of good that are not manufactured. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200517031 (Apr. 29, 2005)
(no excess business holding in an LLC that only collected rents from the lease of land because the
LLC was not a “business enterprise” within the meaning of Section 4943(d)(3)).
188. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(1).
189. Id. § 4943(c)(2).
190. The term “disqualified persons” is defined in Section 4946(a)(1) as (1) substantial
contributors, (2) foundation managers, (3) owners of 20% interests in certain business entities that
are substantial contributors, (4) members of the family of any of the preceding categories, (5) a
corporation, partnership, trust or estate in which the preceding categories of persons have a 35%
beneficial interest, (6) certain governmental officials, and, (7) for purposes of Code Section 4943
only, certain affiliated private foundations. For purposes of ownership in a partnership under the
20% and 35% interest tests, Section 4946 looks to the profits interest in the partnership only. 26
U.S.C. § 4946 (2012).
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depended upon the type of state law entity in which the business
enterprise is formed. Consistent with the business entity dichotomy in
the Code at the time of passage in 1969, Code Section 4943
contemplates two types of business entities: corporations and noncorporations.
B.

Permitted Holdings in a Corporation

The statutory provisions determining a private foundation’s
permitted holdings in a corporation, found in Code Section 4943(c)(2),
are fairly detailed. As a general rule, a private foundation may have
permitted holdings in an incorporated business enterprise191 equal to
20% of the voting stock of the corporation, reduced by the percentage
ownership of all disqualified persons.192 For example, if a corporation
has issued and authorized 100 shares of only one class of voting stock,
then the foundation and all its disqualified persons, collectively, may
own only 20 shares of the corporation. If the foundation’s disqualified
persons already own 20 shares, the foundation would be allowed no
permitted holdings in the corporation unless an exception applied (as
discussed below).
There are a few exceptions to this general rule for corporations.
First, a private foundation may own up to 2% of the voting stock and not
more than 2% by value of all the outstanding shares of stock (voting and
non-voting), even if 20% or more of the voting stock is held by
disqualified persons.193 Therefore, in the example above, even if the
foundation’s disqualified persons owned more than 20 shares of the
stock of the corporation collectively, the foundation would still be
allowed to own two shares of voting stock as permitted holdings.
Additionally, a private foundation and its disqualified persons may
own up to 35% of the voting stock of the corporation if the foundation
can establish, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, that
effective control of the corporation rests with one or more individuals
who are not disqualified persons.194 For these purposes, the term
“effective control” means “the possession, directly or indirectly, of the
191. The regulations provide that the term “incorporated business enterprise” specifically
includes a real estate investment trust defined in 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). Treas. Reg. § 53.49433(b)(1) (as amended in 2009).
192. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
193. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C). For purposes of this de minimis rule, the holdings of various related
private foundations are aggregated, so as to prevent a family from setting up multiple foundations
and giving 2% of a business entity to each of them. Id.
194. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
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power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of
the business enterprise, whether through the ownership of voting stock”
or otherwise, such as voting trusts or contractual arrangements.195 This
typically occurs in the context of publicly traded companies where a
family continues to retain a substantial block of shares in the company
after a public offering.
Finally, a special rule applies if a private foundation owns shares in
a corporation that has both voting and non-voting stock. Under Code
Section 4943(c)(2)(A), if a private foundation and all of its disqualified
persons do not own more than 20% (or 35%, if applicable) of the voting
stock of a corporation, then the foundation may own an unlimited
amount of non-voting stock.196 In this manner, a family can give a
significant amount of the business’s value to a private foundation, so
long as the control of the business remains elsewhere. This exception
makes sense in the context of the legislative history’s focus on the value
of business control to a family and the potential for diversion from
charitable purposes by attention to business matters. Traditional nonvoting stock poses neither of these issues.
The concept of what constitutes “voting stock” becomes a key
inquiry in determining a private foundation’s permitted holdings in a
corporation. The Regulations provide that the term “voting stock” is
“normally” determined by reference to the power to vote for directors,
calculated without regard to treasury stock and authorized (but unissued)
stock.197 The Regulations specifically allow a corporation to “require the
favorable vote of more than a majority of the directors, or of the
outstanding voting stock” for extraordinary corporate actions, such as
amendments to the organization’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.198
Similarly, convertible or contingent stock will be treated as non-voting
stock until the voting rights attributable to the stock actually vest.199
C.

Permitted Holdings in a Partnership or Joint Venture

In stark contrast to the statutory provisions regarding corporations,
Code Section 4943(c)(3) does not contain significant detail with regard
to the calculation of the permitted holdings of a private foundation in
non-corporate entities.200 Rather, Code Section 4943(c)(3) provides that
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(2)(ii).
26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A) (flush language).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(1)(ii).
Id.
Id. § 53.4943-3(b)(2).
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201007062 (Nov. 25, 2009) (limited liability partnership
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“the permitted holdings of a private foundation in any business
enterprise which is not incorporated shall be determined under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”201 The statute then provides
that the regulations be “consistent in principle”202 with the corporate
rules set forth in Section 4943(c)(2); special rules, however, apply for
three different categories of entities: (1) partnerships and joint
ventures,203 (2) sole proprietorships,204 and (3) “any other case.”205
When applying the principles of the corporate rules of Section
4943(c)(2) to partnerships and joint ventures, the statute provides that
the term “profits interest” replaces “voting stock,” and “capital interest”
replaces the term “nonvoting stock.”206 The Regulations provide that one
should simply substitute this language when reading Treasury
Regulation § 53.4943-3(b), which details the rules for corporate holdings
under Code Section 4943(c)(2).207 Accordingly, if the foundation meets
the 20% rule with regard to the profits interest in the partnership, then it
appears that the foundation could hold an unlimited capital interest in the
partnership.
Under the corporate rules, the calculation of permitted holdings
focuses on voting control, which addresses Congress’ concern regarding
the diversion of foundation attention away from charitable activities in
favor of business interests. When applying these rules to partnerships,
however, the calculation of permitted holdings is based on economic
interest and not on voting control.208 Under the regulations, a private
foundation’s interest in the profits of a partnership is determined “in the
same manner as its distributive share” of partnership taxable income
under Code Section 704(b).209 Code Section 704(b) governs the
allocation of items of income and deduction among partners. In general,
the terms of the partnership agreement govern the allocation of items of
income or deduction, unless either the partnership agreement is silent or
the terms of the partnership agreement do not have “substantial

analyzed under the partnership rules but applying the corporate 2% de minimis rule in Code Section
4943(c)(2)(C) as consistent in principle).
201. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3).
202. Id.
203. See id. § 4943(c)(3)(A).
204. See id. § 4943(c)(3)(B) (explicitly providing that a private foundation may not have any
permitted holdings in a sole proprietorship).
205. See id. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (2012).
206. Id. § 4943(c)(3)(A).
207. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2) (as amended in 2009).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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economic effect.”210 When the partnership agreement is silent, a
partner’s share of items of income or deduction will be allocated in
accordance with a partner’s interest in the partnership.211
Unfortunately, there is no generally applicable definition in the
Internal Revenue Code of a partner’s capital interest in a partnership.212
For purposes of Section 4943, a private foundation’s capital interest is
determined first with reference to the applicable provisions of the
partnership agreement. In the absence of a partnership agreement
provision, a foundation’s partnership interest for purposes of Section
4943 is the greater of its interest upon withdrawal from the partnership
or upon liquidation of the partnership.213
In a similar context, the family limited partnership rules set forth
the definition of a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a
material income-producing factor for purposes of Section 704(e).214
Under these rules, the recipient of a capital interest by gift or by
purchase in a capital-intensive partnership will be recognized as a
partner if the transaction is bona fide.215 If, however, the donor retains
control over the transferred interest, directly or indirectly, then the donor
will continue to be treated as the owner of the interest for tax
purposes.216 For purposes of Section 704(e), a partner’s capital interest
210. 26 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) (2012).
211. Id. § 704(b)(1).
212. Sheldon I. Banoff, Identifying Partners’ Interests in Profits and Capital: Uncertainties,
Opportunities and Traps, TAXES –THE TAX MAG., Mar. 2007, at 223 (stating that “neither the Code
nor regulations set forth a comprehensive definition of” a partner’s interest in partnership capital).
213. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2).
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(ii) (as amended 2013) (“a person shall be recognized as a
partner for income tax purposes if he owns a capital interest in such partnership whether or not such
interest is derived by purchase or gift from any other person”); Banoff, supra note 212, at 223.
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii).
216. A transfer of a capital interest to a family limited partnership may, however, be treated as
a “mere sham for tax avoidance or evasion purposes” if the donor remains the real owner of the
interest through the retention of dominion and control over the capital interest that he purported to
transfer. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii). One factor that may indicate a sham transaction is the “retention of
management powers inconsistent with the normal relationships among partners.” Id. § 1.7041(e)(2)(ii)(d). Thus, if a family member attempted to transfer a capital interest to a foundation and
retain ultimate management control over the interest by indirect means, Section 704(e) might
continue to recognize the donor as the partner for income tax purposes. At no point does Code
Section 4943 or its Regulations reference Code Section 704(e) directly, however, so it is unclear
whether and how this might apply for excise tax purposes. Presumably, as Code Section 704(e)
would affect the determination of a partner’s capital and profits interests under Code Section 704(b),
and therefore would apply indirectly. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2). Section 704(e) was added
to the Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (Pub .L. No. 94-455, § 213(c)(3)(A), 90 Stat.
1520), six years after the enactment of Code Section 4943. To the extent that Section 704(e) might
currently act to constrain some creative partnership capital interest allocations, it could not have
acted as such at the time that Code Section 4943 was enacted.
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in a partnership is determined with respect to the owner’s interest in the
partnership upon withdrawal or liquidation.217 By implication, however,
this section acknowledges that management rights could be transferred
with a capital interest in a partnership.
Under the capital and profits test of Code Section 4943, the
question of voting control of the partnership becomes essentially
irrelevant.218 The underlying assumption may have been that, because
the capital interests in the partnership would normally be liable for
losses on dissolution, the capital interests, therefore, must have been
general partners with management rights. This does not appear to be
mandated by state law—a limited partner, by definition, belies this
assumption. A limited partner has a capital interest in the partnership but
is typically unable to be involved in most management decisions other
than major life-cycle voting (dissolution, amendment, bankruptcy, etc.)
in exchange for the partner’s liability protection.219 Under a voting
control based analysis, limited partners look much like non-voting stock
holders. In spite of this similarity, it is very clear that limited partners are
not treated in the same manner as non-voting shareholders because the
permitted holdings test for partnerships does not look at governance
control but at profits interest.220

217. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v).
218. See Banoff, supra note 212, at 254 (“Code Sec. 4943 . . . is unique in its ‘disconnect’ for
purposes of measuring ‘relatedness’ with respect to corporate stock and partnership interests,
respectively.”).
219. At the time of the enactment of Section 4943 in 1969, the original Uniform Limited
Partnership Act passed in 1916 was still the standard for limited partnership statutes, with the first
set of major revisions later to occur in 1976. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws,
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) (2001) (Last Amended 2013): Summary, UNIF. LAW
COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Limited%20Partnership/ulpa%20last%20amended%2020
13%20summary_Jan%202015_GH%20Edits.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). Under section 7 of the
1916 version of ULPA, a limited partner lost liability protection if, “in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.” UNIF. LTD.
P’SHIP ACT § 7 (1916). Section 10 of the 1916 version of ULPA generally gives management power
to the general partner. Id. § 10.
The most recent version of this legislation, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)
was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission in 2001. RULPA § 302 provides that limited
partners have no power to act for or bind the limited partnership; however, RULPA § 303 provides
that a limited partner is not personally liable for the debts of the partnership “even if the limited
partner participates in the management and control of the limited partnership.” UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP
ACT §§ 302-303 (2001) (amended 2013). Therefore, under current law, the assumption that a
limited partner would not have any governance rights over the partnership would not be entirely
correct.
220. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15, 1984).
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Permitted Holdings in an “Etc.”

The title to Code Section 4943(c)(3) is “Permitted Holdings in
Partnerships, Etc.,” leaving open the possibility that other types of
unincorporated business entities might need to be analyzed under
Section 4943(c)(3). Section 4943(c)(3)(C) provides the rules for
determining permitted holdings in “any other case”—that is, any case
that is not a corporation, partnership or joint venture, or sole
proprietorship.221 While it appears that this language was aimed
primarily (but not exclusively) at capturing holdings of business
enterprises held through trusts,222 by its terms, it should apply to any
type of business enterprise not discussed in the other provisions of
Section 4943(c).
For these other entities, Section 4943(c)(3)(C) provides that the
Secretary of the Treasury should promulgate regulations for determining
permitted holdings that are consistent with the corporate rules, with the
term “beneficial interest” substituted for the term “voting stock.”
Significantly, unlike partnerships, there is no analogous language for
“non-voting” stock in an “other unincorporated entity.”223
The regulations further provide that a beneficial interest in an
“unincorporated business enterprise” other than a partnership is
determined with reference to the right to receive profits, or if such
amount is not fixed by an agreement among the participants, then by the
fight to receive assets upon liquidation.224 If there is no agreement, then
beneficial interest is determined on a pro rata basis by dividing the
foundation’s contribution by the sum of all capital contributions made
(or obliged to be made) to the entity.225 This formulation of the
calculation of permitted holdings looks very similar to the general
profit/capital distinction applied by the Regulations to partnerships, with
one significant distinction: one cannot use a pure capital interest as a
substitute for non-voting corporate stock when reading the corporate
rules of Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A) and Treasury Regulation Section

221. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (2012).
222. The title to the applicable regulation is “Trusts and other unincorporated business
enterprises.” The Service has ruled that working interests in oil and gas wells should be analyzed
under the beneficial interest rule. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8920012 (Feb. 8, 1989); see also I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9715031 (Jan. 13, 1997) (potentially applying Code Section 4943 to a management
agreement allowing for a 20% profits interest, although the Service determined that no matter what
entity rule applied, there would be no excess business holding due to the 20% cap on profits).
223. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(i) (as amended in 2009).
224. Id. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(iii).
225. Id.
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53.4943-3(b).226
As with partnerships and joint ventures, the calculation of permitted
holdings of other entities focuses on economic interest and not on
governance control. In a private trust, legal control over investments and
stock is by definition in the hands of the trustee, who has no beneficial
interest in the trust. The beneficial interests held by the beneficiaries of
the trust are purely economic in nature.227 Similarly, for unincorporated
business enterprises that are not trusts, the calculation of permitted
holdings focuses on economic interests and makes no reference to
control of the underlying business entity. Unlike partnerships and trusts,
where the underlying laws governing the entities might provide some
base assumptions regarding the connection between control and
economic interest, there are no such baselines for unincorporated
business enterprises—and there cannot be, as Treasury did not know at
the time what the legal form of those enterprises actually might be.
E.

Permitting Holdings in LLCs: Current Law

Because LLCs did not exist at the time that Code Section 4943 was
enacted, the statute does not mention LLCs explicitly. Similarly, the
Regulations, which were promulgated primarily in 1977,228 do not
mention LLCs. Accordingly, private foundations are left to shoe horn
LLCs into the existing language of a statute that did not contemplate
their existence. There are two ways in which the current statute could
address LLCs: (1) recognizing the entity’s classification as determined
under check-the-box or (2) treating the LLC as an “other unincorporated
entity” under Code Section 4943(c)(3)(C).
1. Check-the-Box
Code Section 4943 could recognize the check-the-box regime,
which would allow an LLC to opt into corporation status or partnership
status by election.229 If the LLC made the election to be treated as a
corporation, the LLC would then explicitly avail itself of the corporate
permitted holdings rules of Code Section 4943(c)(2), including the use

226. See id. § 53.4943-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A).
227. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(4)(ii) provides that the beneficial interest in a trust for
purposes of Code Section 4943 is held by the remainder beneficiaries as determined under Treas.
Reg. § 53.4943-8(b) (2013).
228. T.D. 7496, 1977-2 C.B. 390 (1977).
229. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200124022 (Mar. 13, 2001) (treating a single member LLC
as a disregarded entity in conformance with the check-the-box regulations).
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of non-voting stock.230 The disadvantage, of course, is that the LLC that
elects corporate treatment loses its pass-through income taxation.231
If an LLC did not check the box and, therefore, defaulted to
partnership status, the partnership rules would apply. The LLC would
have the ability to structure its capital and profits interests in the manner
of its choosing—any partner holding a naked capital interest in the
partnership would essentially be treated as having non-voting stock.232
As Code Section 704(b) provides that the allocation of capital interests
and profits interests contained in the partnership agreements is respected
so long as the allocation has substantial economic effect, the LLC treated
as a partnership would have significant leeway in structuring the
partnership’s capital structure. Thus, it would be possible to give the
entire capital interest in an LLC to the private foundation, as long as the
ownership of the profits interests in the LLC met the general permitted
holdings rule.233 It would also be possible to give capital interest to
family members that were not otherwise disqualified persons, as the
capital interest would not cause the holder to become a disqualified
person.234 As the partnership rules do not care about governance control
for purposes of permitted holdings, it appears that the foundation’s (or
other non-disqualified person family member’s) capital interests could
be imbued with such governance authority (including voting for the
manager or governing members) as the LLC might determine to be
appropriate.235
230. Another benefit of corporate status is that the private foundation may be eligible to use
the exception from the self-dealing excise for certain corporate reorganizations under Section
4941(d)(2)(F), which by its terms does not apply to unincorporated entities.
231. One of the reasons why an LLC might elect corporate treatment is so it may apply for
tax-exempt status itself. See generally Robert W. Fritz, The Evolving Use of Limited Liability
Companies by Tax-Exempt Organizations, 13 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 112, 115 (2001). If the LLC were
able to establish an independent basis for tax-exempt status, it is likely that the LLC would qualify
as a functionally related business under 26 U.S.C. § 4943(d)(3)(A) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4942(j)(4)
(2012)) and therefore be exempt from the limitations of Section 4943 altogether because it would
not meet the definition of a “business enterprise.”
232. In addition, the holder of a naked capital interest in the partnership would not be a
disqualified person by virtue of the holding, as the disqualified person status of a partnership is
determined solely with reference to profits interest. 26 U.S.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(iii) & (a)(1)(F)
(2012).
233. It is clear that the capital interest could not have a corresponding profits interest and be
treated as non-voting stock. Thus, limited partnership interests do not automatically qualify as a
non-voting stock equivalent, even though a limited partnership interest typically does not have the
right to participate in the management of the partnership. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15,
1984).
234. 26 U.S.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(iii) and (a)(1)(F).
235. Subject, possibly, to the family limited partnership rules of 26 U.S.C. § 704(e) (2012),
which might work to treat the donor as the continuing partner for purposes of the income tax.
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Section 7701 itself appears to support this approach. Section
7701(a), which includes the definitions of the terms “corporation” and
partnership,” begins by stating that the definitions in that section apply
any time they are used in the whole of Title 26 unless “otherwise
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent
thereof.”236 An entity’s classification under Section 7701 is effective for
all federal tax purposes,237 with the certain limited exceptions not
applicable here. At the time the check-the-box regulations were written,
Treasury could have and did make exceptions to their general
applicability to all federal tax matters.238 It did not make such an
exception for the private foundation excise taxes generally or Section
4943 specifically.
2. “Other Unincorporated Enterprise”
Alternatively, the excess business holdings rules could ignore the
check-the-box regime and classify entities on the basis of state law.
Under this analysis, an LLC is not a partnership for state law purposes
and, therefore, would not be analyzed under the capital and profits
interest rule of Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A). Rather, the LLC would
always be treated as an “etc.”—an unincorporated entity (other than a
partnership or sole proprietorship) under state law analyzed under the
beneficial interest rule of Section 4943(c)(3)(C). Under this analysis, the
LLC’s treatment for excess business holdings purposes would be
divorced from its federal tax classification under Section 7701.
For LLCs taxed as corporations, the difference in analysis is
significant: the permitted holdings in the corporate LLC are determined
based on governance rights, while the permitted holdings for the “other
unincorporated enterprise” LLC are based on economic interest. For the
LLC taxed as a partnership, it may be that the “other unincorporated
enterprise method” and the partnership interest rules under check-thebox align, as the permitted holdings in each are based primarily on a
profits/capital distinction. As a practical matter, if the LLC is organized
on a straight pro rata basis with regard to profits and capital interest, then
236. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (2012).
237. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(2) (as amended in 2014) provides that the “tax treatment of
a change in the classification of an entity for federal tax purposes by election . . . is determined
under all relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the general principles of tax law,
including the step transaction doctrine.”
238. As previously mentioned, there are specific exceptions from the wholly owned entity
rules for certain excise taxes (not Chapter 42) and for employment taxes. Treas. Reg. § 301.77012(c)(2)(v) (as amended in 2014); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2T (as amended 2014).
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the result under each rule would be the same.239 For an LLC treated as a
pro rata partnership, the primary difference between the two
methodologies comes in the treatment of the non-voting stock
equivalent, as the statute explicitly disallows an “other unincorporated
enterprise” from substituting a capital interest for non-voting stock.240 Of
course, nothing requires the LLC to be a pure pro rata arrangement with
regard to capital and profits interests—one of the strengths of the LLC is
its flexibility in drafting governance provisions that meet the needs of its
members.241
If the check-the-box rule is used, the provision in the statute
addressing the permitted holdings of unincorporated entities would
essentially be applied to joint ventures and co-ownership arrangements
that did not rise to the level of a business entity.242 Under the check-thebox rules, all other business entities would be either corporations or
partnerships. This would be contrary to the current interpretation of the
statute in the Regulations, which explicitly details rules for determining
a private foundation’s permitted holdings in an unincorporated entity
other than a trust—these provisions would essentially become obsolete,
at least until the next new state law business entity type comes along.243
3. So Which One Is It?
Sadly, based on a review of existing administrative guidance, it is
not clear which path is the correct one. Because the results in many
situations are essentially the same, it can lead to confusion on the path
taken to get to those results.
In many cases, the IRS has disposed of the excess business
holdings issues involving LLCs on the basis that the LLC is not a
“business enterprise.” As indicated previously, the excess business
holdings rules applies to private foundation holdings in a “business
239. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,195 (Mar. 15, 1984) (limited partnership interests with
pro rata shares of both profits and capital are not equivalent to non-voting shares).
240. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(4)(B) (2012).
241. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110 cmt. (2006) (“A limited liability company
is as much a creature of contract as of statute. . . . The operating agreement is the exclusive
consensual process for modifying this Act’s various default rules pertaining to relationships inter se
the members and between members and the limited liability company.”).
242. The only other arrangements that might be covered would be co-ownership arrangements,
although many of these could rise to the level of a partnership or joint venture, which are clearly
governed by Code Section 4943(c)(3)(A). See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8920012 (Feb. 8, 1989)
(working interests in oil and gas properties held directly by a foundation possibly analyzed as an
unincorporated business enterprise).
243. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(iii) (as amended in 2009).
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enterprise”; if an entity is not a “business enterprise,” then Section 4943
simply does not apply.244 Code Section 4943(d)(3) specifically provides
that an entity is not a business enterprise if 95% of its gross income is
generated from passive sources.245 Thus, many rulings find that LLCs
are not business enterprises due to the 95% passive income rule. In those
rulings, the IRS’ discussion of the permitted holdings rules for LLCs is
not determinative of the outcome of the ruling and, therefore, is often
vague or incomplete.
For example, in Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 201333020,246 the IRS
leans toward a check-the-box analysis, but this analysis is not
determinative for purposes of the ruling. In this case, a private
foundation held an interest in a hedge fund. The hedge fund was
organized as an LLC and taxed as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes.247 Another member of the LLC held all of the Class B
membership interests in the LLC, which represented a 10% income
interest in the LLC. This member proposed to give all of the Class B
membership interests to the private foundation.248 In reciting the law
applicable to the foundation’s permitted holdings in the LLC, the IRS
noted that a private foundation is allowed 20% of the voting stock of a
corporation reduced by the holdings of its disqualified persons.249 It went
on to state that “I.R.C. §4943(c)(3) provides that for interest in any
partnership or joint venture the word ‘profit interest’ should be
substituted for the word ‘voting stock’ in the definition of permitted
holdings.”250 Note that, while the ruling did not cite specifically to the
partnership rule (§ 4943(c)(3)(A)), it did mention that it was applying
the partnership rule.251 The ruling made no mention of unincorporated
enterprises other than partnerships, which would have been covered by §
4943(c)(3)(C)). Later in the ruling, it again discussed the partnership rule
(with citation to § 4943(c)(3) as a whole), although it is not

244. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(a).
245. Id. § 4943(d)(3)(B). Passive sources include the items excluded from the unrelated
business income tax under Section 512(b)(1), (2) and (5) as well as the income from the sales of
goods not manufactured or actively distributed by the entity. Id. § 4943(d)(3) (flush language).
246. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201333020 (Aug. 16, 2013) (LLC that was taxed as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes operated an investment hedge fund; LLC was not a business enterprise
within the meaning of Section 4943(d)(3), but the IRS also noted that “the holdings of the LLC will
not be excess business holdings”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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determinative of the ruling.252 Once again, the IRS held that the hedge
fund would not be a business enterprise that was even subject to Section
4943, although it went on to state that “the holdings of LLC will not be
excess business holdings” without further analysis.253 Although it is not
entirely explicit, it certainly looks like the Service was leaning toward
analyzing the LLC as a partnership under § 4943(c)(3)(A) and not as an
unincorporated business entity under § 4943(c)(3)(C).
On the other hand, PLR 200650018, which discussed a private
foundation’s excess business holdings in an LLC that owned farm
property and operations,254 appears to use the “other unincorporated
enterprise” rule for analyzing LLC permitted holdings. This PLR noted,
“under section 4943(c)(3) a private foundation is permitted to hold up to
twenty percent of the profits interest in an unincorporated business
enterprise.”255 As with the citation in PLR 201333020 (discussed above),
the ruling citation did not does not distinguish between the partnership
rule (contained in § 4943(c)(3)(A)) or the other unincorporated entity
rule (contained in § 4943(c)(3)(C)), although it did use the term
“unincorporated business enterprise.”256 Later in the PLR, the IRS noted
that the foundation would have an excess business holding because its
“ownership and profits interests in the Farm and [LLC] . . . both exceed
twenty percent.”257 At first glance, this appears to be a partnership
analysis;258 however, the Regulations for other unincorporated
associations discuss analyzing a beneficial interest with reference to,
first, a profits interest and then to a dissolution or liquidation interest—
which is a similar (although not identical) test for a capital interest in a
partnership. The ruling did not use the term “capital” interest but rather
talked about “ownership.”259 The PLR itself was a request for an
extension of the five-year period in which a private foundation must
dispose of certain excess holdings—as a result, the PLR was able to
address the extension issue while still stating, “We do not rule on
whether your interest in the LLC constitutes an excess business

252. Id.
253. Id.
254. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200650018 (Sept. 21, 2006).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200517031 (Feb. 2, 2005) (finding no excess business
holdings on other grounds, but citing the partnership rules found in Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2) as
the basis for determining the permitted holdings in an LLC).
259. Id.
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holding.”260
Distributions from limited partnerships, themselves, can be deemed
passive income.261 In PLR 200611034, the Service stated that “[l]imited
partner interests are passive investment that are comparable to stock and
securities. As with a holder of corporate stock, a limited partner does not
participate in the trade or business.”262 In support of this proposition, the
Service noted that the characterization of limited partner interests as
passive, and therefore not business enterprises altogether, is compatible
with the purpose of Section 4943. “One of the concerns of lawmakers
was that foundation managers paid too much attention to the
maintenance and improvement of business interests to the detriment of
the time and energy expended on charitable duties.”263 The IRS was
comfortable with this ruling because traditional notions of limited
partnership provide that the limited partner could not be involved in the
management of the business. Therefore, by definition, the foundation, as
a limited partner, could not be diverted away from charitable activities
by his or her involvement in the limited partnership, as there was no
such involvement.
If a private foundation held a capital interest in an LLC that was
taxed as a partnership under the check-the-box rules, nothing in the
language of Code Section 4943 or in the statutory framework of most
state enabling statutes would prevent the private foundation from having
governance rights. Thus, the underlying assumption that a diversion
from charitable activities cannot happen with a limited partner due to the
state law prohibition on the exercise of most administrative powers by a
limited partner does not work with an LLC.264
IV. OPTIONS FOR INCORPORATING LLCS EXPLICITLY INTO SECTION
4943
A.

Framework for Evaluating Options
The discussions that preceded the enactment of Code Section 4943

260. Id. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200438042 (Sept. 17, 2004) and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200438043 (Sept. 17, 2004) (citing but not analyzing the unincorporated business enterprise rules in
a request for the extension of the five-year period to dispose of holdings in an LLC taxed as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes).
261. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200611034 (Mar. 17, 2006).
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 413 Pt. 1, at 27 (1969); S. Rep. No. 552, at 38-39 (1969)).
264. The current version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership would grant limited
partners a greater ability to participate in limited partnership management without losing limited
liability. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 302-303 (2001) (amended 2013).
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indicate that Congress saw the private foundation as an important
vehicle to advance “individual experimentation and the exercise of
creative imagination” in the public space.265 The 1965 Report adopted a
pluralism theory of tax exemption,266 which emphasizes the need for
charitable vehicles that encourage innovation and diversity of thought.
Pluralism theory posits that the nonprofit sector, controlled by neither
government nor business, provides an outlet for discourse and debate
that is not beholden to these interests.267 Nicholas Cafardi, in a speech on
the necessity of the nonprofit sector, stated:
Imagine, if you will, an America in which the public discourse is

265. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
266. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §1.3, at 9-11 (10th ed.
2011); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, (1997) (viewing promotion of pluralism and
diversity as a “metabenefit” under traditional subsidy theory); John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty
Under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB. LAW. 1, 70 (1978) (citing various examples of critical
foundation support for “dissenting and unorthodox ideas”).
267. Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations:
The Need for a National Policy, 1968 U. SO. CAL. L. CTR. TAX INST. 27, 39-40 (“charity . . .
provides a unique and flexible form of social organization that counterbalances the vast power of
government and the concentrated wealth of the private sector”); Simon, supra note 266, at 74. See
also Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52
OHIO. ST. L.J. 1379, 1430-31 (1991) (citation omitted) (discussing “classic liberalism and the value
of pluralism” in the context of a donative theory of tax exemption, where “the charitable subsidy [is]
distributed automatically based on autonomous decisions by individual donors that determine which
activities within the nonprofit sector are socially valued”).
The notion that, free from government and business interference, a charity would be unfettered in its
pursuit of its charitable goals is not without its flaws. For example, without the ability to offer stock,
nonprofits are unable to access equity markets to fund their charitable activities. Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) (tax-exempt status is
justified to compensate nonprofits for their inability to access capital due to the non-distribution
constraint). Accordingly, nonprofits must find other sources of funds—for the private foundation,
that typically means contributions from its founder, his or her family members, and affiliated
businesses. The nonprofit is then at the whim of its donors if it does not have an independent source
of funding. If the strength of the foundation is its ability to realize the ideas of innovative thinkers,
its flaw is its compulsion to follow the whims of idiosyncratic donors. See Simon, supra note 266, at
page 69 (“One can imagine a second, somewhat less elitist, proposition that might go like this:
whether or not wealthy givers are better suited to uphold cultural and intellectual standards, affluent
individuals are more likely to be idiosyncratic or unorthodox. . . . Whatever the reason, such
idiosyncrasy or heterodoxy is more likely to result in a charitable product that is different from what
majoritarian preferences might produce, thus justifying the inegalitarian charitable deduction in the
name of pluralism”). At least in the case of the private foundation, contributions already received
can produce a flow of funds that would support its charitable mission even if no further donations
were received. See generally Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence
of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 461 (1996)
(“Each of the nonprofit’s constituents has its own goals, which can be furthered either by exercising
‘voice’ (imposing conditions on the donation or contract) or ‘exit” rights (withholding future
donations or dealings).”).
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controlled and the public agenda is set by a confluence of government
and commerce, without anyone to say them nay. What kind of America
would that be? I suggest to you that it would not be a very free
America.
Something more is needed, something that keeps government and
business from controlling our entire way of life. This is what the
[nonprofit sector] does. Its very existence guarantees the lively public
268
debate that makes American society so unique in the world . . . .

It is clear from the discussion in the 1965 Report that Congress
valued the unique role that private foundations played in the charitable
sector specifically and in society generally. At the time, many critics
advocated for abolition of the private foundation or at least imposition of
a requirement of full payout of all assets within a short time frame.269
Congress resisted these calls by highlighting the unique strengths of the
private foundation.270 Private foundations provided a dedicated
endowment for charitable purposes, thus ensuring the long-term viability
of the charitable sector generally. A private foundation is not, however,
wedded to another charity like other types of endowments, such as the
university endowment or the supporting organization.271 Accordingly,
the private foundation has the flexibility to vary its beneficiaries in a
way that other endowment-type organizations cannot. A private
foundation can support multiple causes and adapt and change its
funding streams as projects may require.
It is this flexibility that Congress appeared to value most.272 As a
private foundation does not need to appeal to a broad cross-section of the
general public for funding, it is free to pursue those projects and issues
that it determines to be appropriate.273 In furtherance of these projects, it
can impose requirements and outcomes through its grant agreement. It
can agree to multi-year funding in order to provide stability to a

268. Nicholas P. Cafardi, Address at the Meeting of the Westmoreland County Bar Ass’n: The
Third Sector (Nov. 13, 1992), in TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 123
(Nicholas P. Cafardi & Jaclyn Fabean Cherry eds., 2d ed. 2008).
269. Crimm, supra note 9, 1114-15.
270. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-12.
271. Public university endowments are typically public charities under Code Section 509(a)(1)
by virtue of being described in Code Section 170(b)(1)(a)(iv), which requires the expenditures to be
made to or for the benefit of a public college or university. In order to qualify as a public charity by
virtue of being a supporting organization, the supporting organization must have a defined
relationship with one or more other public charities (called supported organizations) and may not
make distributions for any other purpose. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(3) (2012).
272. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
273. Id.
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project;274 it can also provide that funding can be withdrawn in order to
encourage individual projects to find other funding in the marketplace of
charitable ideas. As the private foundation is not bound to a particular
charity (except for its own voluntary grant agreements), it can pivot to
other grant recipients or even other projects as it deems necessary.275
This may be because a project has been successfully completed, because
the project was a worthy but ultimately unsuccessful experiment, or
because the problem to be address has changed in some way to make the
project moot.276 Regardless of the reason, Congress believed that the
flexibility of the private foundation put it in a unique position to fund
innovation and add to the pluralism of ideas in the charitable sector.
Through the excess business holdings excise tax, Congress sought
to protect and enhance a private foundation’s innovative approach to
charity by requiring the foundation’s attention and assets to be focused
on these creative philanthropic endeavors.277 Thus, in the corporate
context, the statute prevents the diversion of a private foundation’s
attention toward business endeavors by limiting the private foundation’s
ability to hold stock (using, perhaps inadvisably, partnership
profits/capital distinction as a flawed proxy278 for control).279 As
indicated, however, this limitation did not extend to passive income, as
Congress understood that part of the job of a private foundation is to
invest and grow its assets.280 Similarly, it did not extend this to
functionally related businesses, as there was an acknowledgement that
274. For example, for purposes of meeting the mandatory distribution requirements of Code
Section 4942, a private foundation may, under certain circumstances, set aside funds for a multiyear, specific project but treat them as distributed in the year of the set-aside. See 26 U.S.C. §
4942(g)(2) (2012).
275. Code Section 4945 generally allows a private foundation to fund charitable activities
(within the meaning of Code Section 170(c)(2)(b)) carried on by any entity—even a for-profit
entity. 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2012). There are, however, administrative requirements for certain
grants to individuals and grants to non-public charities ostensibly designed to ensure that a nonpublic charity will dedicate the funds to charitable purposes. See id. § 4945(g)-(h).
276. Of course, the downside of all of this flexibility is that charitable assets may be wasted on
the larks of wayward boards. With no shareholders to constrain spending, there is little impetus to
control for waste—especially in the endowed foundation, where the funding stream continues
unabated into perpetuity—or at least as long as the investment managers do their jobs. See generally
Brody, supra note 267, at 463-64.
277. Stone, supra note 267, at 51.
278. Banoff, supra note 212, at 255 (criticizing the use of partner capital and profits interest as
a measure of relatedness, stating, “[i]f the concern underlying ‘relatedness’ is manipulation or
collusion for tax purposes by a partner and his controlled partnership, ‘control’ can be defined other
than by reference to [profits, capital], or the relative value of the partners’ interests”).
279. For a critique of the argument that holding voting stock is tantamount to operating
business involvement, see Schmalbeck, supra note 19, at 84.
280. Id. at 61-2; see also 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
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charitable purposes could be furthered through investments in
businesses.281
When evaluating the options for incorporating LLCs explicitly into
the statutory provisions of Section 4943, one could simply be guided by
this original Congressional intent. There is the possibility that Congress’
original intent, while well-meaning, is sufficiently dated as to no longer
provide appropriate guidelines for informing future revisions to Section
4943’s statutory and regulatory provisions. An argument can still be
made, however, that the tensions that informed the passage of Code
Section 4943 in the 1960s remain relevant today. One need look no
further than the current debate over social enterprise to see this same
issue up for discussion today: how can the legal framework regulating
charities encourage the flexibility to allow people to creatively address
social problems while preventing the misuse of charitable assets?
One of the strengths of the social enterprise entity is its flexibility—
it is not constrained by nonprofit limitations or corporate benefit
maximization directives. A social enterprise typically combines in a
single entity the dual missions of profit seeking through active business
operations and the accomplishment of charitable goals—the exact
combination of activities that Congress attempted to regulate through the
enactment of Code Section 4943.282 Proponents of social enterprise posit
that the combination of for-profit methods and the charitable outcomes
need not be in conflict with one another. Rather, in the correct
combination, business goals and methodologies can enhance, not distract
from, the foundation’s charitable mission.283 In fact, social enterprise
highlights the synergies of business and charity that will encourage
“individual experimentation and the exercise of creative imagination”284
in the entrepreneurial-minded285—the same result professed to be the
281. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(d)(3)(A) (2012) (excluding functionally related business from the
definition of business enterprise.)
282. John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for
L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 117 (2010) (stating the L3C “unites
in one enterprise two principles often considered irreconcilably in competition with each other:
pursuing charitable exempt purposes and generating and distributing profits”).
283. The Social Enterprise Alliance is one of the primary organizations promoting social
enterprise, stating that social enterprise is the “Missing Middle,” combining efficiency,
sustainability, creativity, and generosity in a way not seen in the traditional sectors of the economy.
ENTERPRISE
ALLIANCE,
https://seSee
What
We’re
All
About,
SOC.
alliance.org/why#whatwereallabout (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); see also Thomas Kelley, Law and
Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009).
284. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
285. Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 427 (stating, “Social entrepreneurs . . . desire the
flexibility to seek non-traditional approaches in conducting their business and to access a broad
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benefit of private foundations according to the 1965 Report.
While the possibility of synergy exists, the tension between
business and charitable goals within social enterprise remains. One of
the issues that Code Section 4943 was intended to address was whether
the attention of a private foundation was focused on its charitable
mission or diverted to business endeavors. Similarly, one of the
perceived weaknesses of social enterprise (at least from a nonprofit
perspective) is that there is little guidance on exactly how “charitable” a
social enterprise must be, both at inception and operationally. While
most state L3C enabling statutes at least require the charitable purpose
of the enterprise to be significant,286 there is no similar requirement in
most benefit corporation legislation.287 In fact, in the benefit corporation
context, many statutes specifically give the board of directors of the
benefit corporation, when contemplating corporate actions, the ability to
weigh various interests—including, but not limited to, its shareholders
and its public purpose.288 The statute is quite clear that unless the
organization’s articles of incorporation state to the contrary, no
particular interest (including the public purpose) is given priority over
another.289
As noted by Professor Dana Brakman Reiser in her review of
Google.org, Google’s for-profit philanthropic arm, “[w]hat begins as
philanthropic mission could, as a result of it being embedded within a
business, become biased toward alignment with the goals of the forprofit company.”290 Similarly, practical considerations regarding the

range of capital”).
286. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(a) (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg.
Sess.) (“A low-profit limited liability company shall at all times significantly further the
accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes . . .”). This requirement was
originally intended to comply with the requirements for program-related investments as described in
another private foundation excise tax from 1969, the jeopardizing investment excise tax of Code
Section 4944. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2012).
287. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31F-3-301 (LexisNexis 2014) (“A benefit corporation
shall have as one of its purposes the purpose of creating a general public benefit.”). Connecticut’s
benefit corporation legislation includes language attempting to make sure that any benefit
corporation assets stay within the charitable or social enterprise realm. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
33-1355 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2015). For a review of the status of social enterprise
organizations in the various states, see Cass Brewer, Social Enterprise Law Update and Map,
SOCENT L. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/08/social-enterprise-law-update-and-map/.
288. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31F-4-401(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2014).
289. See, e.g., id. § 31F-4-401(a)(3). See also Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 426
(discussing the perils inherent in balancing the interests of the multiple stakeholders of a benefit
corporation).
290. Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2465
(2009).
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manner in which social enterprises raise capital and interact with profitmotivated investors may inform (or skew) the way a particular entity
balances its business and charitable goals.291
One of the other purported goals of Code Section 4943 was to
prevent the potential for subtle acts of self-dealing. Attempting to
analogize Code Section 4943 to social enterprise with regard to the
misuse of charitable assets poses a fundamental issue. Unlike the private
foundation, which is forbidden from making distributions for the
personal benefit of its foundations, the social enterprise organization
explicitly may. Indeed, that is part of the point of the social enterprise
organization.
Are the assets of a social enterprise organization charitable at all?
Critics have highlighted this issue of “is it charitable?” as a potential
concern regarding the regulation of the social enterprise organization. In
this context, there are more questions than answers. If the social
enterprise organization is using its charitable purpose as part of an
appeal for capital, but the assets are not so used, is there a risk of
misleading donors/investors that should be addressed by solicitation or
similar legislation?292 If assets given to a social enterprise organization
are supposed to be used for charity, does that give regulators on the state
and federal level the ability to enforce that use?293 If some of the assets
of a social enterprise are, in fact, dedicated to charity, how much benefit
can accrue to the enterprise’s owners before it is too much?294
291. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations – A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 609-10 (2011).
292. Id. at 615 (critiquing the benefit corporation’s reporting mechanism, which is intended to
inform shareholders and other constituents of the social benefit activities of the organization);
Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at 436 (“The public perception that charitable enterprises are
valuable and deserve subsidy is vulnerable, however, and attempts by hybrid promoters to tap into
that sentiment could have serious consequences.”).
293. Illinois’ L3C legislation is fairly unique in that it explicitly subjects an L3C to the state’s
Charitable Trust Act, which in turn authorizes oversight by the Attorney General. See 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. Sess.); Charitable Trust Act,
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1 (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. Sess.); Mayer & Ganahl, supra
note 8, at 432-36 (discussing the weaknesses of current oversight of social enterprise organizations);
Tyler, supra note 282, at 150 (arguing that traditional charitable nonprofit enforcement tools are not
appropriate for social enterprise organizations); Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation
and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2010).
294. See, e.g., supra note 287 (discussing Connecticut’s attempt to insure that assets
contributed to a social enterprise would be “locked in” to those purposes). In the federal income tax
context, Mayer and Ganahl in Taxing Social Enterprise consider the issues that would arise if the
Internal Revenue Code provided tax benefits to social enterprise in order to subsidize socially
beneficial behavior and reward risk-taking, but note that if the entity ultimately turns a profit, then
“the profits (and the subsidy) will flow to investors, providing a private benefit”). Mayer & Ganahl,
supra note 8, at 429.
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Although there are few, if any, answers to these questions in the
social enterprise context, we can look back to see how Congress
struggled to answer similar questions in the context of Code Section
4943. If an organization holds itself out to the public as charitable and,
as a result, benefits from tax-exemption, should the public expect a
certain level of charitable use? Is there a role for state and federal
regulators in enforcing this expectation? And how much can the
founders of the foundation benefit from otherwise charitable assets
before it is too much? In passing all of the private foundation excise
taxes, Congress clearly answered “yes” to all of these questions and tried
to draw the lines that are only now faintly seen in the social enterprise
context.
The social enterprise debate highlights the continuing desire for
legal frameworks that provide the nonprofit sector with the flexibility295
to foster innovation in addressing social need with the attendant danger
of diversion of charitable assets and attention—the same concerns
present in the debate over Code Section 4943 in the 1960s. Although
traditional pluralism concerns may, to some, seem outmoded, they
appear to be alive and well in this modern form. If these discussions are
distilled down to a general framework, any revisions to Code Section
4943 to address LLCs should:
•

ensure organizational attention to charitable purpose;

•

while allowing for flexibility to pursue charitable purposes;

•

minimize the potential for subtle acts of self-dealing not
otherwise captured by Code Section 4941; and

•

allow for modern investment activities that provide for a
reasonable inflation-adjusted return at an appropriate level of
risk, all while

•

provide clear guidance for the IRS, the donating public,
private foundations and the rest of the nonprofit sector, and

295. Benjamin M. Leff, Preventing Private Inurement in Tranched Social Enterprises, 45
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (citing Robert A. Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal Context, 54
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233, 233 (2006) (the tax regime applicable to nonprofits “is sometimes not
flexible enough to accommodate . . . new ideas and methods”)) (new social enterprise entities are
“‘deregulatory,’ in the sense that the new business forms are intended to free social enterprise from
a variety of laws that constrain the ‘traditional’ nonprofit sector”); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 8, at
427 (“Hybrids are widely lauded for their ability to aid entrepreneurs seeking better solutions to
social needs due to their simplicity and flexibility”); Kelley, supra note 283, at 340-41 (social
enterprise “entrepreneurs claim to inhabit a frontier where outmoded law and inappropriate old-style
legal entities hamstring their socially transformative plans”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

51

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2

536

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:485

the investment community.

With these goals established by a framework of pluralism as originally
professed by Congress in 1965, and updated and informed by the
concerns about the interaction of business and charity as voiced in the
debate over social enterprise, it is possible to evaluate the alternatives to
the treatment of LLCs under Code Section 4943.
B.

The Unincorporated Association Route

One could simply take the language of Code Section 4943 at face
value and treat LLCs as that which they are: unincorporated business
enterprises. Clearly, Congress contemplated that there would be
ownership structures that would not fall into one of the neat categories of
corporation and partnership, which would need to be addressed in some
manner. Given that a statutory catch-all category exists, it seems like the
obvious answer would be to use it.
This approach overestimates the value of the catch-all category. If
one looks at the types of abuses that Congress considered at the time of
the passage of Section 4943, this category appears to have been intended
for trusts and co-ownership arrangements, especially for real property.296
At no point does it appear there was any thought that Code Section 4943
needed the flexibility to address emerging forms of business ownership,
although it may have been a happy by-product of the statutory language.
The use of the term “beneficial interest” as the statutory measure of
permitted holdings provides private foundations with little guidance as
to how to comply.
For this reason, there does not appear to have been the level of
Congressional focus on the manner in which permitted holdings should
be calculated for any of the non-corporate holdings, not to mention the
other unincorporated business enterprise provisions. All of the focus, as
demonstrated in Part II of this Article, was on corporate holdings, with
barely a mention of the partnership, never mind other potential forms of
business ownership.
By focusing on beneficial interest as the measure of ownership, the
unincorporated association rules do not address the fundamental
concerns that Congress had when passing Code Section 4943 in the LLC
context. If the primary concern is control (and the attendant diversion of

296. For example, see the co-ownership and real estate easement examples in the 1965 Report.
The language chosen for the statute—”beneficial interest”—comports with this understanding. 1965
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20, 30.
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attention), the beneficial interest rule does not address that issue in any
way. This may be a fundamental flaw of both Section 4943(c)(3)(A) and
Section 4943(c)(3)(C), in that both the partnership and the other
unincorporated entity rules focus on economic interest and not on
control.297 At least in the context of the general partnership, it may have
been reasonable to conclude at the time that control would follow
beneficial interest, although clearly the limited partnership was there for
consideration.
The control issue becomes even more pronounced with the LLC,
however, given that the strength of the LLC from a state law perspective
is flexibility in both economic structure and governance while
preserving corporate-style limited liability. The LLC provides more
significant opportunities for combinations of economic interest and
governance control than ever before, which may not have been
contemplated given Congress’ understanding of business structures
available at the time.
Simultaneously, the unincorporated business entity rules of Section
4943(c)(3)(C) are too narrow for modern investing practice, as they do
not allow for a private foundation to have an analog to non-voting
interests. It is not uncommon for private foundations to invest through
hedge funds, and other collective investment vehicles, which can be in
LLC form. Private foundations have very little control over the
investments in these funds—in some instances, foundations struggle to
even know what the fund holds.298 It does not appear that Congress
intended to curb legitimate and accepted means of investing the
foundation’s portfolio through Code Section 4943. Rather, Section 4943
should be able to adapt and encourage modern investment portfolio
theories and techniques, while limiting direct control over operating
businesses, which the unincorporated association route may not do.
C.

Respect Check-the-Box

The path of least resistance would be simply to respect the
classification of an entity under the check-the-box regime. Corporations
would continue to be corporations; partnerships (both limited and
general) would be partnerships. LLCs, to the extent not disregarded,
would be partnerships unless the specific LLC had checked the box to
elect corporate treatment. Permitted holdings in the LLC would then be
analyzed under either the corporate rules of Section 4943(c)(2) or the
297.
298.
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partnership rules of Section 4943(c)(3)(A). The other unincorporated
business entity rules of Section 4943(c)(3)(C) simply would not apply.
The benefit of this approach is that it utilizes the existing mechanics
of Section 7701, with which one assumes most LLCs are already
familiar. It allows the entity the flexibility to order its affairs in the
manner most appropriate to its business model and to take advantage of
the governance innovations inherent in LLCs. It would also be easy to
administer, as the classification of the LLC and the analysis of permitted
holdings would be relatively mechanical once the tax classification of
the entity was established. Finally, it comports with the general
understanding of the scope of the check-the box rules—they apply for all
federal tax purposes unless specifically excepted by regulation.
This model is also inherently flawed for two reasons. While the
simplicity and symmetry of the approach is compelling, it does not
adequately address Congress’ fundamental concern about active
involvement of private foundations in business affairs.
In the case of the LLC taxed as a partnership, the concern over
active involvement flows from the original statutory choice to judge
permitted holdings of pass-through entities based on economic interest
rather than governance control. While economic interest and governance
control may often coincide, that is certainly not a result mandated by
state statute. In the case of the unincorporated enterprise, Congress had
to assume that beneficial interest and governance control would align—
it had no basis upon which to presume otherwise—and it guarded
against the possibility by not allowing for an analogous holding similar
to non-voting stock.299 As discussed previously,300 it appears that an
LLC could be set up to give voting rights to the holders of the capital
interest of the LLC. As the statute provides that capital interests in the
LLC taxed as a partnership are analogous to non-voting stock, these
interests could be unlimited so long as 20% or less of the profits interest
is held by disqualified persons.301
If an LLC checks the box to be taxed as a corporation, then
permitted holdings would be determined based upon the power to elect
the “directors” of the organization.302 But who are the “directors” of an
LLC? In an LLC with voting equity members and a Board of Managers
299. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A) (2012) (allowing for capital interests to be treated as
nonvoting stock for partnerships) with id. § 4943(c)(3)(C) (not allowing an analogous interest for
nonvoting stock in the case of other unincorporated enterprises).
300. See supra Part II.E.2.
301. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(A) & (c)(3)(C).
302. Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2009).
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elected by the members, we can treat the members as shareholders and
the Board of Managers as the directors. But what if the LLC operating
agreement seriously limits the power delegated to the manager, so that
office is more akin to a chief administrator rather than a policy setting
body? Should we disregard the manager and treat the members as both
“directors” and “shareholders”? But in such a case, or in the case of a
member-managed LLC, the members are not elected—they have
governance rights because they are, essentially, shareholders. In that
case how does the corporate voting test (a vote for the directors) apply?
If a foundation did not have the right to vote for the “directors”—
whomever they may be—then all of the foundation’s holdings would be
permitted holdings if only 20% of the voting equity was held by
disqualified persons.303 For example, assume that the manager in a
manager-managed LLC is deemed to be the “director” for purposes of
determining what voting stock might be. If 80% of the power to vote for
the manager is given to non-disqualified persons (such as a sibling,
niece, or nephew of the founding donor304 ), could the foundation retain
all other powers of governance inherent to a member and be able to hold
an unlimited amount of such equity? Given the almost unlimited ability
to tailor the governance of the LLC as desired, query whether the
corporate voting test, without further definition, is adequate addresses
the concern about corporate control inherent in Code Section 4943 for
LLCs taxed as corporations.
In either case, the potential for mischief in the form of retained
foundation control seems apparent. It may be that this mischief is
ultimately restrained, for the most part, by the limitation that only 20%
of the voting interest (however it is ultimately defined) in an LLC is
taxed as a corporation305 or 20% of the profits interest of a partnership
may be owned by disqualified persons.306 Even so, the ambiguity
remains problematic for those foundations that are interested in investing
in LLCs as a matter of an allocation to an alternative equity investment
as part of its regular portfolio.

303. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(3)(C).
304. For purposes of determining a foundation’s disqualified persons, the definition of a
“member of the family” for purposes of Code Section 4943 does not include the siblings of a
substantial contributor or foundation manager, or any of the sibling’s descendants. Compare 26
U.S.C. § 4943 with 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(4) (2012) (including siblings and their spouses within the
meaning of member of the family for purposes of the excess benefit transaction excise tax
applicable to public charities).
305. 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(2).
306. Id. § 4943(c)(3)(A).
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A Proposal: Modified Check-the- Box

Despite its flaws, check-the-box provides clear guidance to private
foundations with minimal administrative burden to Treasury and is
consistent with the treatment of entity classification across the Code.
That being said, LLCs are not corporations, and they are not
partnerships—that is the strength of the LLC. They allow the flexibility
to combine economic interest and governance rights in as many varied
ways as the creative drafter can imagine. Thus, neither the
unincorporated association option nor a pure check-the-box regime
sufficiently protects against the issue of business involvement and
diversion from charitable endeavors.
In the best of all worlds, the check-the-box rules would be
respected but the statutory partnership rules would be changed, such that
the analog to voting stock would be a general partnership interest and the
analog to non-voting stock would be a limited partnership interest with
no management rights. Such a test would prevent gamesmanship with
capital/partnership interest and would provide a bright-line test for
ownership for both limited partnerships and LLCs taxed as partnerships.
It would also allow private foundations to invest in modern alternative
investment opportunities in limited partnership form without limitation.
Consistent with the current rules, no more than 20% of the general
partnership interests could be held by disqualified persons. In most such
cases, the general partner of those partnerships is an unrelated entity that
is managing the fund; therefore, all of the issues of control and attention
do not come into play with such an investment, as the limited partner is
truly a passive investor.
In the case of LLCs, since there is no general partner with unlimited
liability, the measure of permitted holdings should depend upon how the
LLC is organized. In a member-managed LLC, all of the equity owners
have governance rights by default, and therefore, all should be treated as
analogous to general partners even though they have no liability. It
should be possible, however, to draft for a class of membership interest
in a member-managed LLC that disclaims all governance rights so it
looks more like a limited partnership interest. By way of example, the
allowable rights that could be retained by a limited partner might be
those consent rights currently provided as default rights in the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of 2001, which includes admission of partners,
amendment of the partnership agreement, expulsions, conversion,
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merger, and dissolution.307 If there are non-management members, then
those individuals would be treated as non-voting members as long as
20% or less of the management member interests was held by nondisqualified persons.
Similarly, in the case of manager-managed LLCs, the manager or
the board of managers would be treated as if they were a board of
directors. Thus, all of the members entitled to vote for the manager
would be treated as voting shareholders, subject to the 20% rule. To be
considered a non-voting shareholder with the power to hold unlimited
amounts of equity, the shareholder must give up more than just the right
to vote for the manager—rather, the non-voting member must give up all
governance rights consistent with historical limited partnership status.
Anyone retaining governance rights beyond these limited rights would
be treated as a voting member. This rule prevents a situation where the
manager is stripped of most management rights, effectively making the
LLC member-managed, but the foundation’s right to vote for a
placeholder manager is stripped away to comply with the excess
business holdings rules. Again, this rule effectively addresses the control
issue for purposes of Code Section 4943 but allows private foundations
to invest in most third party alternative investment funds.
Of course, under this scenario, there is a statutory change to Code
Section 4943(c)(3), so that Treasury’s ability to promulgate regulations
under that section is not limited to regulations “consistent in principle
with” the corporate rules, utilizing profits and capital interests as an
analog to voting and non-voting interests, respectively. Without that
statutory change, Treasury is stuck using profits and capital as proxies
for control for both partnerships and LLCs. In such a case, the danger
lies primarily in giving capital interests (whether in partnerships or
LLCs) excessive voting control. Thus, Treasury might look to the antiabuse regulations of Section 704(e) for inspiration, which provide that
the transferee of a transfer (by gift or purchase) of a capital interest in a
capital-intensive partnership will be ignored as a partner for federal
income tax purposes if the donor, directly or indirectly, retains control
over the capital through other means.308 In the case of Code Section
4943, the issue might be reversed—that is, in lieu of stripping the capital
interest of all governance rights so that the transferor did not relinquish
dominion and control of the capital interest (as would happen under
Code Section 704(e)), the profits interests are stripped of all governance
307.
308.
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rights and given to the capital interests. In such a scenario, the capital
interests would not be treated as transferred to the foundation but would
be deemed to be retained by the original transferor.
While the application of such an anti-abuse rule would address the
control issue inherent in evaluating an LLC under an economic standard,
it could be argued that such a facts-and-circumstances rule does not give
sufficient guidance to the foundation. However, the transfer of a naked
capital interest imbued with excessive governance rights to a private
foundation, with only 20% of the profits interest retained by disqualified
persons with respect to the foundation, does not appear to be the type of
transaction that would occur in the normal course. Rather, it would
likely occur in the context of a family transfer. One might argue in retort
that it is exactly the type of transaction that should be made difficult to
undertake in order to avoid those “subtle forms” of self-dealing that
Code Section 4943 was intended to capture.309
If the LLC checks the box as a corporation, then it would be
allowed to have an unlimited amount of non-voting stock so long as
non-disqualified persons owned less than 20% of the voting stock. In the
corporate context, voting stock was determined on the basis of the ability
to vote for the governing body of the corporation. As mentioned earlier,
given the flexibility of governance inherent in the LLC form, the regular
corporate rules that equated voting for a director with control are
insufficient, especially in the case of a member-managed LLC where
there are no directors. An LLC governed by its members looks more like
a general partnership than a corporation for control purposes.
Accordingly, the non-voting share rule should apply only to those LLCs
that are governed primarily by a manager or board of managers. As
described above, the regulations could provide a safe harbor that would
recognize a class of membership interest that would be “non-voting” if
they retained only those interests akin to limited partnership rights310—
even if the LLC were member managed or the LLC was not primarily
governed by a board of managers. Again, this should give most
309. 1965 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
310. Alternatively, one could provide that the voting members in a manager-managed LLC
would only have those powers set forth in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (amended
2013) or those rights that are given to the members by default in the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (2006) (amended 2013), without regard to changes that might be made in
the LLC’s articles of organization or operating agreement. This, however, seems to be much less of
a bright-line test than the list of enumerated powers set forth in ULPA. Additionally, reference to
default rules in an enabling statute would mean that the definition of voting might vary by
jurisdiction, depending upon what changes a state made to the LLC enabling act when adopting it,
which in turn could encourage foundation forum shopping and the unequal treatment of taxpayers.
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foundations the flexibility to invest in alternative investments that are
run by third party managers without violating the control mechanisms to
be addressed by Code Section 4943.
V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
Much has happened since 1969 when Section 4943 was first
enacted: LLCs arrived, the corporate tax rate is on par with the highest
marginal individual income tax rates, and the check-the-box regime
governs entity classification. Outside of law, foundation investing has
turned away from old fiduciary ideas of permissible investments to
prudent investment rules, total return investing, and allocations to
alterative equity holdings.
Although the world has changed, the fundamental concerns
expressed in the 1960s—preventing distraction by business opportunities
and undue benefit to private parties while preserving flexibility to invest
and innovate—remain relevant today, as evidenced by the fact that these
themes appear in contemporaneous debate regarding social enterprise.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to keep these considerations in mind
even today while formulating amendments to Code Section 4943.
In the best of all worlds, Congress could amend Section 4943 to
address all the changes that have occurred in the tax and investment
world since its initial passage. Congress could include provisions that
specifically provide for LLCs and, while it is at it, reconsider the manner
in which Section 4943 approaches other pass-through entities, such as
limited partnerships.
In lieu of Congressional action, Treasury can clarify by
administrative action the manner in which it approaches the Section
4943 analysis for LLCs. Such a pronouncement would at least provide
some direction for those private foundations with sophisticated
investment portfolios for which the technical distinction may make
significant difference. While such guidance would be better than
nothing, it would not address the fundamental concerns raised by
Congress in 1969 that remain relevant today: How much involvement in
business activities is permissible? How can we allow foundations to
invest wisely while ensuring that they remain appropriately focused on
charitable endeavors?
A modified check-the-box approach to the application of Section
4943, as described in Part IV.C above, would provide appropriate
guidance, administrative ease, and the flexibility to invest foundation
assets in most third party investment opportunities in an appropriate
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manner. While a pure check-the-box methodology runs the possibility of
allowing too much involvement of a foundation in business activities,
thus running afoul of Congressional intent as expressed in 1965, a
modified method geared specifically at the issue of allocating
governance rights in a manner to manipulate the statute could provide a
sufficient curb on involvement in business governance as to prevent
undue distraction. Moreover, it would follow the modern trend of
allowing foundations to adopt business methodologies that further
charitable purposes, while not ignoring the appropriate distinctions
between business and charity altogether.
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VI. APPENDIX
Text of 26 U.S.C. § 4943(c)(1), (2), and (3) (2012)
(c) Excess business holdings. For purposes of this section—
(1) In general. The term “excess business holdings” means, with
respect to the holdings of any private foundation in any business
enterprise, the amount of stock or other interest in the enterprise which
the foundation would have to dispose of to a person other than a
disqualified person in order for the remaining holdings of the foundation
in such enterprise to be permitted holdings.
(2) Permitted holdings in a corporation
(A) In general. The permitted holdings of any private foundation in
an incorporated business enterprise are—
(i) 20 percent of the voting stock, reduced by
(ii) the percentage of the voting stock owned by all disqualified
persons.
In any case in which all disqualified persons together do not own
more than 20 percent of the voting stock of an incorporated business
enterprise, nonvoting stock held by the private foundation shall also be
treated as permitted holdings.
(B) 35 percent rule where third person has effective control of
enterprise.
If—
(i) the private foundation and all disqualified persons together do
not own more than 35 percent of the voting stock of an incorporated
business enterprise, and
(ii) it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that effective
control of the corporation is in one or more persons who are not
disqualified persons with respect to the foundation,
then subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting 35 percent
for 20 percent.
(C) 2 percent de minimis rule. A private foundation shall not be
treated as having excess business holdings in any corporation in which it
(together with all other private foundations which are described in
section 4946(a)(1)(H)) owns not more than 2 percent of the voting stock
and not more than 2 percent in value of all outstanding shares of all
classes of stock.
(3) Permitted holdings in partnerships, etc. The permitted
holdings of a private foundation in any business enterprise which is not
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incorporated shall be determined under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary. Such regulations shall be consistent in principle with
paragraphs (2) and (4), except that—
in the case of a partnership or joint venture, “profits interest” shall
be substituted for “voting stock”, and “capital interest” shall be
substituted for “nonvoting stock”,
in the case of a proprietorship, there shall be no permitted holdings,
and
(C) in any other case, “beneficial interest” shall be substituted for
“voting stock”.
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